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INTRODUCT IO N
The g r o wth a nd de ve l opment of the socia l s cien ces,
particularly psycho l ogy , over the past 100 years, has been
paralleled by a n incr eas ing. use an d acceptance of
psychologists as e xpert wi tnesses within the criminal
justice system.

Thi s is ha r dly surprising, and on the face

of it, not at all co nt r ov er si a l .

Psychologists have come to

be considered e xpert s in matters of human behavior (Hoch &
Darley, 1962), and concomit a nt l y in the subset of criminally
relevant beh a vior.

As s uch , they are considered privy to

information about crimi nals and criminal behavior which
would otherwise be unava i lable to courts and juries, and so
have gained a ccept a nc e as expert witnesses.
Closer examin ation, however, of the psychology/criminal
justice interface re vea l s an area teeming with ambiguity and
controversy (Huc kabee, 1980; Shah, 1969).

At one extreme

pos i t ion a r e th os e who would severe l y restrict the role
pl a ye d by the social sciences in the courtroom (Morse, 1978;
Sz as z , 1979).

At the other are those who would have the

social sciences play a much larger role in determination of
what exactly constitutes criminal conduct, as well as in the
dispositions of criminal offenders (Bromberg, 1979; Lane &
Kling, 1978; Monahan, 1977; Silverman, 1969).

These two
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poles, and the myriad of positions that fall between them,
reflect the philosophical underpinnings of the varied
conceptions of legal insanity.

It is only through an

examination of these conceptions, including their evolution
over the years, that the role of psychology in the courts
can be understood.

Accordingly, the various tests of

insan · ty that have been employed will be examined in some
detail.
This is a difficult area to get to the core of, and not
just because it concerns the interface of two quite
different fields, law and psychology.

Rather, it is

proposed that an essential difficulty is the fact that
practitioners from both fields underestimate, or even
ignore, the basic differences between these areas.

The

examination of insanity tests will show that social
scientists have been, and continue to be, woefully
uninformed about the workings of the legal system and the
principles underlying it.

Lawyers and judges, for their

part, have often been bewildered and mystified by psychology, thereby being unclear as to how to accommodate the
genuine insights psychology can provide to the criminal
justice system.

Yet despite the ignorance and confusion

that demonstrably pervade the interface, there is room for
optimism.

There is evidence to suggest that non-expert

jurors can, and have been, able to understand the issues and
make appropriate decisions in ''insanity" cases (Fingarette &
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Hasse, 1979; Moore, 1980; Witty, 1982).

This is not to

su gge s t that the psychological expert is superfluous, but
s imply overexte n ded in terms o f his/her courtroom role.

The

s luti on t o th e confusio n may l i e largely in understanding
what j uri e s have always understood, if only implicitly,
about crimin a l r e sponsibi l ity.
Before e xamin i ng specific insanity tests, one of the
cornerstones of ou r cr i minal justice system must be
explored .

I refer to th e fa ct t hat a criminal event

involves not just a s pe c if i c action, but some sort of
criminal intent i on as we l l.

In considering this area, it

becomes clear that t he traditio nal requirement of "mens
rea," vari o us l y int er pr eted as guilty mind, evil mind or
criminal intent (Pl a t t & Di amo nd, 1978), virtually
necessitates some form of insanity defense, regardless of
what it is call ed or how it is worded.

Traditionally and

properly, t he law r equires a n escape valve, which will serve
to protect th ose not meeting the requirements of mens rea
f r om cr iminal r e sponsibility and prosecution.

Understanding

thi s escape valve is the key, and it is the same
understanding attributed to juries above.
Our current system of justice is but the latest result
of an evoluationary process, the beginning of which predates
I

the formalized development of psychology and psychiatry by
at least several hundred years.

Yet, those early criminal

justice systems invariably allowed for certain exceptions to
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the usual presumptions of responsibility (Robinson, 1980).
These e xcepti ons ge neral ly i nc l uded children, and those
deemed ma d , a j ud gemen t apparently made fairly easily:

it

requir ed su bst a nti al ev i dence of extreme intellectual
deficit and social malfun c tion.

At this point, the decision

to ex use was s trictly a le gal and social decision; there
was simply no oth er way.
The early formaliz ed i nsan i ty tests seemed to reflect
the popular understan d i ng of mad ness.

Understanding may

seem like a curi o us wor d to use, in light of the great lack
of insight that pr eva il ed, until relatively recently,
regardin

mental d i s o rders.

What was understood, however,

if only implicitly, wa s t he no tion that lack of rationality,
in certain situat io ns a nd for certain persons, defeated, in
part o r in whol e , the ascr i ption of criminal responsibility
(Finga r ett e & Ha sse, 19 79; Moore, 1980).

This notion, this

understanding to whi ch I keep referring, has shown itself to
be nea r ly i mpo ss i ble to satisfactorily codify, at least to
d ate .
As psyc h i atry and psychology became formalized and
accepted, the medical model of madness concurrently achieved
widespread acceptance, both in society and in the courts.
Indeed, most insanity tests developed over the past 100
years make reference to "diseases of the mind" (Hermann,

1983).

That these diseases had unknown or obscure

etiologies and equally unknown cures was of little
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consequence, apparently.

What was important was that there

were now social sciences with which to understand and
humanely deal with "madmen," and the enthusiasm engendered
by this seemingly enlightened approach was bound to infuse
the criminal justice system.

The problems which this would

ultimately engender were initially held in check by an
understanding among juries (an understanding now often
for otten) that mental illness, whatever it was and wherever
it came from,

was just one factor to be considered in making

judgements about criminal responsibility (Neu, 1980).
Another limiting factor was the fact that insanity defenses
were rarely used, and even more rarely used successfully.
In any case, the criminal justice system has been
burdened with a succession of insanity defenses which have
been ambiguous, have typically included references to
knowledge both personal and not verifiable, and which have
tended to confuse or even bewilder juries.
continued to make the necessary judgements.
to time, close calls would arise:

Still, juries
But from time

For any given insanity

test, there will be persons who will unquestionably be
deemed insane, or equally unquestionably sane.
others, judgement is more difficult.

But for

Fortunately, from the

point of view of criminal justice, psychology and psychiatry
had progressed to the point where they could provide experts
to help the courts deal with some of their thornier cases.
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Experts could now appear in court to explain madness:
what i t was (invariabl y a d i sease entity), where it came
f r om, how t o treat i t, etc.

This gave rise to a

conside r able d i ff i culty, one which persists to this day.
The problem is t hi s:

As a rule, we don't hold a person

responsible f or de ve l o p in g ca nce r or kidney disease, so it
would seem reasonable t o appl y t hi s same standard to mental
illness as well .

So , if crim in a l ly relevant behavior is

directly resultant f r om men ta l i l lness, the alleged criminal
clearly is not r es po ns i bl e for his/her act, certainly no
more than a polio vic t im is he l d responsible for his/her
paralysis .

But if me nt a l ill ness entails a lack of

responsibility, what i s l ef t for the jury to decide?

The

answer, of course , i s nothi ng , except perhaps which of the
opposing experts to agr ee with.

While this may allow for an

illusion of judici a l decision-making, it is clear that the
significant dete r min a t io ns are made by expert witnesses.
While the l aw ha s o fte n , and recently (Morse, 1982),
recognized t ha t thi s i s a bad wa y of conducting judicial
bu si ne s s , the nature, or at least the wording, of the
in s anity tests themselves seem to invite the social
scientist into the courtroom.

While the invitation is

understandable, the tests rarely define how the experts
should contribute, or how these contributions should be
considered.

"A fundamental reason for the insanity defense

is to provide a legal framework to aid the court, the jury
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and attorneys in evaluating the testimony of psychiatrists
and placing it in proper legal, social and moral
perspective" (Stone, 1975, p. 227).
The mental health professionals who testify in criminal
proceedings often disagree with each other, a situation
engendering a variety of effects.

As mentioned, disagree-

ment allows the jury to make a decision, even if it is not
the one they were chosen to make.

And while the "battles of

the experts," at least in highly publicized trials, often
result in public dissatisfaction with both the legal and
psychological professions, a more important problem is that
such battles tend to obfuscate the essential nature of the
decisions the court requires be made, as well as who is best
equipped, le ally, morally, and otherwise, to make them.
This, then, is at the heart of the matter to be dealt
with in this paper:

What is the nature of the relationship

between the criminal justice system and the mentally
disturbed offender?
addressed.

Specifically, three questions will be

First, what is insanity?

There is of course no

unitary answer to this question, as amply evidenced by the
multitude of insanity tests that have been, and continue to
be employed.

Accordingly, the historical and contemporary

insanity tests will be reviewed, along with their roots in
mens rea and other common threads, with an aim towards
explicating the concept of insanity.

Secondly, what is the

proper relationship between psychology and the criminal
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justice system?

This is a controversial area, and the

answer is critically and almost inextricably linked to the
answer to the first question of what insanity is.

To get at

the answer to this question, some central concepts from both
the law and psychology will be considered.

Also, a number

of conflicts, both within the field of psychology
(particularly involving the medical model), and between
psychology and criminal justice (e.g., determinism versus
free will, and treatment versus social control) will be
exam i ned.

Thirdly, what is the proper role of the expert

psychological witness in criminal justice proceedings?
Clearly, the answer to this depends very much on the answers
to the first two questions.

That, plus a consideration of

what psychologists actually do in court, for better or
worse, will lead to some conclusions about what, if
anything, psychologists should be doing in court.
A strongly critical eye is required for getting to the
heart of the problems at this interface, and many of the
writers I will cite are certainly critical of much that they
see.

It must be acknowledged, however, that many commen-

tators view both historical and contemporary developments in
this area as quite benign, and see events as leading to an
inevitable and happy union of criminal justice and clinical
psychology (Monahan, 1977).
considered as well.

This point of view will be
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Discussion of insanity suggests that it will never be
finally and conclusively defined to everyone's satisfaction.
These are matters, after all, about which reasonable people
may reasonably disagree.

Yet, despite the confusion that

exists at the psychology/law interface, clarity of purpose,
as well as an integration of many seemingly disparate
viewpoints, is both desirable and attainable.

I hope this

paper will contribute to that end.
After considering future needs for both research and
education, I will offer a summary and conclusions, but will
not offer my own ideas for the "ideal" insanity defense.
Most writers on this subject do that, and I have no wish to
contribute to the clutter.

I will, however, spend some time

considering the Disability of Mind (DOM) doctrine offered by
Herbert Fingarette (1979), which comes closer than most
proposals in identifying the central issues, and dealing
with them appropriately and competently.

CHAPTER I
A History of Insanity
Insanity is not a recently developed concept.

As Moore

(1980) points out, "legal insanity in some form has been an
excuse from criminal responsibility for centuries" (p. 27).
The criminal justice systems of most civilizations throughout history have recognized that certain persons who commit
what otherwise would unequivocally be considered illegal
acts should not be held responsible for these acts.

I

refer, of course, to situations that clearly go beyond the
traditionally employed and commonly accepted excuses of
ignorance, accident and compulsion; inadvertant homicide is
not considered murder, otherwise illegal acts committed at
gunpoint generally are not prosecuted, etc.

To understand

the nature of the excuses which legal insanity provides for,
we need to turn to the concept of "mens rea."
Mens rea, variously interpreted as guilty mind, evil
mind, or criminal intent, is a concept dating to antiquity:
The principle of 'mens rea' or 'guilty mind' was
recognized in the Talmud, which specified that
minors, the deaf and dumb, mental defectives and
the mentally disordered were not to be held
culpable for crimes. The very harsh and punitive
Greek Draconian Code also embodies mens rea in a
very clear distinction between involuntary
homicide and murder. Children and the insane were
exempted from contractual obligations under the
Code of Justinian.
(Rieber & Vetter, 1978, p. 6)
10
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Even at this early point, we can see the genesis of problems
and questions which have confused and confounded society up
to contemporary times.

What exactly is mens rea?

How does

one clearly distinguish between a guilty mind and an
innocent mind?

Who is best able to make judgements

concerning these distinctions?

These, and other equally

critical, substantive issues, will be dealt with in-depth
later in this paper.

But now, we need return to the

historical review of the concept of insanity.
Though the concept of mens rea is ancient, "it remained
for Christian ethics to extend and elaborate upon its
metaphy s ical and pragmatic ramifications" (Platt & Diamond,

19 78, p. 55).

These extensions and elaborations take the

form of a myriad of insanity tests, of which the most
significant will be considered shortly.
refers to a legal standard:

Insanity generally

"Legal insanity is a test of

capacity for choice and action; it is a formulation designed
to determine responsibility" (Hermann, 1983, p. 7).

This

definition highlights a point of overriding importance, that
being, that insanity is, first and foremost, a legal
concept.

This is easy to forget, in light of the wide

variety of popular usages the term has acquired, as well as
the wide variety of misuses that the term is subjected to by
both legal and mental health professionals.

However, by

keeping the primarily legal nature of insanity uppermost in
our minds, we can facilitate our understanding and
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resolution of certain sharply-contested issues, including
expert psychological testimony, that are addressed later in
this paper.
In his excellent review of historical insanity tests,
Bromberg (1979) informs us that "the first available test of
insanity dates to 1265, and was stated by Bracton,
archdeacon of Barnstable:

'An insane person is one who does

not know what he is doing, is lacking in mind and reason and
is not far removed from the brutes'" ( p. 5).

It is worth

noting that this earliest of insanity tests is composed of
ordinary, everyday language, and suggests a judgement that
ordinary, everyday people were quite capable of making.

Of

course, there was no alternative - the social sciences had
yet to evolve - but this is precisely the point:

Insanity

was a viable concept centuries before there were mental
health experts to explain what it was, as well as who
deserved to be

cate~orized

as insane.

The next major test, enunciated by Sir Mathew Hale in
1671, stated that "such a person is laboring under
melancholy distemper hath yet ordinarily as great understanding a child of fourteen years hath, is such a person as
may be guilty of treason or felony" (Bromberg, 1979, p. 5).
This early test points out an enduring problem with insanity
tests, which concerns the ambiguity of the language with
which they must be composed.

In this case, the term

understanding may certainly be variously interpreted.

At
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any rate, this test asserts a strong relationship between
intellectual deficit and excuse from criminal responsibility.

As Hermann (1983) explains, "Hale proceeds to

explicit recognition of the defense of insanity; since
liberty or freedom of the will presupposes understanding, it
follows that where there is a total deficit of the
understanding, there is no free act of the will in the
choice of things or actions" (p. 25).

So, if there is no

free will, there can be no criminal intent, no mens rea, and
no criminal responsibility ascribed.
In 1724 Judge Tracy, in the Arnold case, provided some
needed clarification to the Hale test in elaborating on
understanding:

"Not every kind of frantic humour ••• points

him out to be a madman as is exempted from punishment; it
must be a man totally deprived of his understanding and
memory and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an
infant, than a brute, or a wild beast" (Bromberg, 1979,
p. 6).

It is interesting to note that whereas Hale

apparently allowed for degrees of insanity, for Judge Tracy
it was an all or nothing affair:

"Rex vs. Arnold. became

authority for the proposition that total insanity was
required for exculpation from a criminal conviction where
madness was the preferred defense" (Hermann, 1983, p. 29).
In any event, what both of these tests make clear is that
although "craziness" may be a necessary precondition to a
determination of insanity, it alone is certainly
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insufficient for making that judgement.

The question is not

"is this person crazy"? but rather, "is this person crazy
enough to be considered insane"?
Next to be considered is the Hadfield case of 1800.
The defense attorney, Erskine, offered the following
defense:

"By insanity, I mean that state when the mind is

under the influence of delusions, where the reasoning
proceeds upon something which has no truth ... but vainly
built upon some morbid image formed in a distempered
imagination" (Bromberg, 1979, p. 7).

This defense was

accepted and simplified (perhaps oversimplified) by Judge
Kenyon:

"If a man is in a deranged state of mind at the

time, he is not criminally responsible for his acts"
(Hermann, 1983, p. 32).
Several aspects of this test merit comment.

For one,

this test is a departure from "wild beast" in that the
emphasis has shifted from the absence or deficit of
intellect to the presence of morbid delusions.

For another,

this test seems to be a step backward in precision, for
whereas Judge Tracy specified the conditions that would
excuse, Judge Kenyon simply referred to derangement.
Finally, Hadfield may be viewed as the first modern insanity
test, insofar as it clearly anticipates one of the currently
used tests, that of the American Law Insistute (ALI):
charge (Hadfield) approached the standard most recently

"This
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adopted in one American jurisdiction (ALI), that where the
capacity to appreciate or conform is impaired, the defendant
is not culpable and cannot justly be held responsible"
(Hermann, 1983, p. 32).
It must be mentioned at this point that we are now
considering the time period when the medical model of
insanity was beginning to hold sway.

Indeed, "by 1800, many

of the influential writers on the subject agreed that in
nearly every case of insanity there was a disease of the
brain" (Robinson, 1980, p. 37).
The last significant test prior to M'Naghten arose from
the Bellingham case in 1812, which saw a change in emphasis
from 'deprivation of understanding' to 'distinguishing good
from evil"' (Bromberg, 1979, p. 7).

Once more we see an

erosion of intellectual criteria, clearly inherent in the
idea of understanding, and substitution of criteria which
are broader and ambiguous, adding as they do emotional and
even religious components to the cognitive basis.
Perhaps the most well-known legal definition of
insanity is the M'Naghten test (M'Naghten's Case, 1843).
Although not a breakthrough in any real sense, the test is
significant in that it is still widely used today (including
in the state of Florida).

The test itself states "that to

establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that at the time of committing the act, the
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party accused was laboring under such defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong."

The emphasis on the

ability to understand the difference between right and wrong
has led many to refer to M'Naghten as the "right and wrong"
test.
As stated, M'Naghten broke no new ground:

"The 'right

and wrong' test was used in England to determine the
criminal capacity of children as early as the fourteenth
century.

It has been widely used in the United States for

both children and the insane since 1800.

The essential

concept and phraseology of the rule were already ancient and
thoroughly embedded in the law'' (Platt & Diamond, 1978,
p. 78).

Yet even though M'Naghten said nothing really new,

it is still in widespread use over 140 years later, and for
that reason alone is deserving of close scrutiny.
One noteworthy aspect of this test is the reference to
"disease of the mind."

Although the medical model of

madness had been gaining ground for some time, it had not
been codified in law until this point.

Since that time, the

concept of "mental disease" has become an institutionalized
aspect of virtually all insanity defenses, despite the fact
that it is a concept of constantly changing, not to mention
ambiguous criteria.

"Common to all tests is the use of the

concept 'mental illness' or 'mental disease'.

However, it
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is a common failure of these tests that they lack significant definition or provision of normative criteria for the
concept of 'mental disease'" (Hermann, 1983, p. 129).
M'Naghten, in emphasizing knowledge of right and wrong,
clearly establishes an intellectual, or cognitive definition
of insanity, and as such, may be accurately viewed as a
reversion to earlier standards.

Consequently, M'Naghten, at

least in terms of how it is most often interpreted, provides
a relatively narrow definition of insanity, applicable to
few people in rare circumstances.

"The M'Naghten ruling has

been viewed as a restrictive ruling reflecting an outmoded
and discredited faulty psychology, which classified mental
processes into cognitive, emotional and control components
and considered a person as insane only if serious cognitive
or intellectual impairment was evident.

Consequently, the

M'Naghten ruling tends to limit the definition of insanity
to a condition suffered by the most deteriorated psychotics"
(Rieber & Vetter, 1978, p. 49).

This statement makes it

clear why insanity defenses, in jurisdictions where
M'Naghten is operative, are rarely raised and even more
rarely successful.

More importantly, however, this

statement reflects an often seen and critical confusion
about the relationship between criminal justice and social
science.

Specifically, Rieber and Vetter have based their

remarks on a · faulty assumption, namely that the criminal
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justice system is obliged to follow trends and developments
within the field of psychology, and to alter its standards
of criminal responsibility accordingly.

This point of view

is not only logically indefensible, but potentially
dangerous as well.

The problem with subverting, even in

part, the field of criminal justice to the field of
psychology 1 , especially considering the extremely
disparate natures of these two areas, is that justice and
our democratic ideals may be threatened.

This will become

clearer when expert psychological testimony is discussed,
which will amply illustrate the dangers in question.

For

now, it will suffice to note an origin of these problems in
M'Naghten itself, which exhibits the beginning of a shift in
decision-making responsibility from lay juror to expert
witness:

"M'Naghten removes such considerations (e.g.,

delusions) from the opinions and reflections of jurors and
locates them in the realm of 'expert testimony' where
questions of physiology must be settled" (Robinson, 1980,
p. 41).

Just a year after M'Naghten, an important decision was
handed down in an American trial.

The decision in the

Rogers (1844) case broke with the past in asserting that
simply the presence of mental disturbance might suffice to
excuse from criminal responsibility:

"The jury must

acquit - even when there is a sense of right and wrong, even
when the delusion and the act have no coherent relation -
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when it is shown that the prisoner was of diseased mind and
the act was the result of disease" (Robinson, 1980, p. 50).
Despite its vagueness and absence of guidance it provides
for making the required judgement, the Rogers case sustained
an influence over considerations of insanity, particularly
in the United States, for

w~ll

over a hundred years.

Indeed, the famous Durham rule of 1953, which will be
considered shortly, is directly anticipated by Rogers.
As stated earlier, M'Naghten was a test that foe
the cognitive aspects of mental functioning.

'~ed

on

"The M'Naghten

Rule asserts that responsibility is a function of the
intellect" (Leifer, 1964, p. 825).

But many authorities

thought, and continue to think, that such a focus provided
an incomplete, or even distorted understanding of those
criminal acts and actors warranting a determination of
insanity.

Thus, "the claim that M'Naghten focused

exclusively on cognition led to the development of the
'irresistible impulse' doctrine as supplemental to M'Naghten
in some states" (Hermann, 1983, p. 38).

The doctrine

itself, first codified in the Parsons case (Parsons v.
State, 1887), states that a person should be considered
insane if "though conscious of the nature of the act and
able to distinguish between right and wrong and know that
the act is wrong, yet his will, by which I mean the
governing power of his mind, has been otherwise than
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voluntarily so completely destroyed that his actions are not
subject to it, but are beyond his control" (pp. 886-887).
A problem here is that although irresistible impulse is
generally considered as a supplement to M'Naghten, what it
actually does is provide an alternative.

This doctrine

states that a person whose cognitive faculties are intact
may still be found insane if his mind is disturbed in
anot er area.

"Succinctly put, the irresistible impulse

doctrine is a test for insanity that holds that account
should be taken of the effect of insanity upon emotions and
will power" (Hermann, 1983, p. 38).

It thus becomes clear

that the adoption of irresistible impulse owes at least as
much to the thinking underlying Rogers (and Durham) as it
does to the perceived shortcomings of the M'Naghten rule.
The Durham decision (Durham v. U.S., 1954), also
known as the "product test," simply states that "an accused
is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or defect" (p. 54).

This test

clearly reflects the thinking underlying Rogers, which
refused to require a direct, causal relationship to be
established between some specific aspect of mental
disturbance and a specific illegal act.

Instead, it

requires only that the existence of some sort of mental
disturbance be established, and a demonstration that,
somehow, this disturbance resulted in a criminal act.

This

loosening of judicial standards reflects a triumph for the
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medical model, which was indeed the intent.

"This test was

envisioned as an improvement on M'Naghten in that it moved
away from moral judgments to the more factual basis of
medical concepts" (Brakel & Rock, 1971, p. 381).

Although

the "factual" basis of psychiatric concepts is debatable at
best (and will be explored later), it is a notion that has
largely been accepted by society at large and by the
judicial system in particular.

It is therefore hardly

surprising that ''Durham was decided explicitly to facilitate
psychiatrists in placing their knowledge before the court,
which they felt they could not do under the M'Naghten test"
( Moore, 1980, p. 37).
Thou gh Durham was designed to allow greater latitude
for expert psychiatric testimony, it in fact went too far.
Psychiatrists moved away from the roles of advisors and
providers of information, to the roles of decision-makers,
from witness status to that of the triers of facts.

Indeed,

"many psychiatrists interpreted Durham as an invitation for
them to decide who should and who should not be held
criminally responsible" (Dershowitz, 1968, pp. 29-30).
The ability of psychiatry to expand its influence in
court was further heightened by the nature of the terms used
in the Durham rule, specifically mental illness, mental
defect and product.

This contributed to the impression that

the required decisions were medical and not legal.

Further,

the varying interpretations these terms may be given, even
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within the psychiatric community, tended to allow for a wide
variety of psychiatric testimony.

"The imprecision of the

definitions of these critical terms are the greatest defect
in the Durham opinion, and subsequent efforts at clarification did not prove satisfactory" (Hermann, 1983, p. 46).
The increase in psychiatric influence in the criminal
courtroom necessarily resulted in a parallel diminution of
the jury's power and responsibilities.

Quite simply, the

Durham rule eroded the traditional and rightful charge of
juries to make judgments about criminal culpability.

"One

problem was that there was no standard by which the jury
could make a determination as to whether or not the
defendant ought to be held responsible if medical experts
testified that the act was produced by a mental disease or
defect" (Huckabee, 1980, p. 16).
This shift in the responsibility for judicial decisionmaking is directly attributable to the faulty assumption,
discussed earlier, that M'Naghten was based on an outmoded
psychology and was therefore inappropriate as a legal
standard.

In fact, the Durham rule is the best example we

have of the confusion that pervades the psychology/criminal
justice interface, and clearly illustrates how this
confusion is linked to the inability, or unwillingness, of
each field to come to grips with the essential and critical
differences, in terms of philosophy, perspective and
operations, that exist between the two fields.

"(Durham)
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changes the legal definition of responsibility from a
competent intellect to a well integrated personality.

This

is to assume that the M'Naghten ruling was an erroneous
characterization of human nature rather than a criterion for
the ascription of legal responsibility, and betrays the
psychiatric tendency to redefine all human events in its own
terms" (Leifer, 1964, p. 827).
The Durham rule was subjected to substantial criticism,
and was ultimately supplanted by the test proposed by the
American Law Institute.

The ALI test (United States v.

Brawner, 1972), finalized in 1962 and now recognized as the
standard for insanity within the federal court system,
states that "a person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of
mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law."

Even a

cursory glance at this test reveals that it contains nothing
that is truly new, much less revolutionary.

Instead, we

have a modernized rehash of earlier tests, once again
associated with the misguided assumption that legal
standards should be formulated in accordance with
contemporary psychological thought.

"Basically, it recasts

the M'Naghten test and the irresistible impulse test in
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terms felt to be compatible with modern psychiatric opinion"
(Hermann, 1983, p. 50).
It is not surprising that those who embrace the
"misguided assumption" discussed above, who favor the
increasing influence of psychology on the judicial system,
are likely to view ALI as a definite advance over earlier
tests.

For example, psychiatrist Walter Bromberg, who views

both psychiatry and criminal justice in terms of their
potential for social engineering, thinks ALI is a better
test:

"The essential improvement over M'Naghten was the use

of the word 'appreciate' rather than 'know' to include the
full meaning of cognition with its emotional component"
Bromberg, 1979, p. 55).
On the other hand, and as had become customary in this
review of insanity tests, we again see serious problems with
the definition and interpretation of critical terms.
"Appreciate" is one such term, which the ALI rule does not
even attempt to define.

Of course, if a jury cannot

adequately comprehend the term, it is likely that psychiatry
will be given that much more leeway to explain it.

To the

extent that this is valid, we have a better insight into the
approval psychiatry bestows upon "appreciate," as well as a
strong suggestion that psychiatry conceded little influence
after all when Durham was left by the wayside.
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A similar discussion is applicable to an even more

contentious phrase, "substantial capacity":
Mental illness or defect is defined variously by
various authorities, but what constitutes
substantial capacity? Where does capacity start
to become insubstantial or when does it cease to
be insubstantial, nonsubstantial? That is really
the question which, when we take the stand in such
matters, the courts have to grapple with.
(Portnow, 1974, p. 7005)
Portnow asks some good questions, but offers no
answers.

This is not to single out Portnow, for these

questions are not really psychiatric ones, and there is
really no reason to presume that psychiatry has any special
insight into them.

Indeed, Huckabee notes that "over the

years since the development of the ALI test, psychiatrists
have conceded to me that they do not really know what the
word substantial in the ALI test means" (Huckabee, 1980,
p. 22) •

Though psychiatry may be confused by the wording or
phraseology of insanity statutes, such confusion rarely
translates into reduced testimonial zealousness in the
courtroom.

Also noteworthy is the tendency of psychiatry to

place the burden of resolving contentious issues completely
upon the shoulders of the judiciary (Portnow says the
courts have to grapple).

This is accompanied by an equal

and opposite effort on the part of the criminal justice
system.

Indeed, the literature is replete with examples of

both camps washing their hands of problematic areas,
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insisting that the other side must deal with them.

This

incessant shirking of what should be mutual concerns poses a
s ignifi cant imped i ment to progress is dealing with, much
le s s res o lv i ng, problems of the law/psychology interface.
Though M' Nagh t en and ALI are the predominant insanity
tests at this t i me, other standards are in use.

California,

for example, has been a leader in the development and use of
the doct r ine of d imi n i she d capacit y . This doctr i ne is based
on the assumption that "cr imin a l i nt en t - indeed the
capacity for premedi ta ti on and malice, is altered by mental
or emotional d isor der s a nd reduces the degree of the crime"
(Diamond , B. L., i n T . G. Harris, 1969, p. 55).

Specifi-

cally, the doctrine hol ds t hat a defendant is held
responsible for a l esser cr i me than he would be if there
were no ment a l illn ess or incapacity (Harris, 1969).
The probl e ms an d shortcomings of the other insanity
t e sts discuss ed earlier are generally applicable to
dimin is hed ca p acity, and need not be repeated here.
However, all those problems take on a larger significance
in sofar as diminished capacity effectively increases the
scope of psychiatric excusing.

"A defendant's degree of

mental impairment may qualify him for a successful defense
of diminished capacity but not for support of the insanity
plea.

This is consistent with the cases and

authorities . . • indicating that less serious mental
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disorders are admissible under the mens rea concept than
under the insanity defense" (Huckabee, 1980, p. 38).
There can be no doubt that diminished capacity
represents an expanded, medical model insanity defense, with
greater opportunity for, and a broader scope of expert
psychiatric testimony.

Not surprisingly, some curious

defenses have been raised under diminished capacity.
Perhaps the most notable is the "Twinkie" defense, successfully employed by Dan White, who in November 1978 killed San
Francisco's mayor and one of its supervisors.

The killings

were apparently carefully planned and executed.

Part of the

defense included psychiatric testimony as to the effects of
White's overindulgence in junk food.

White was found guilty

of a lesser charge, and was recently released from
incarceration.

There can be little doubt that "today,

psychiatrists can be found to tell a jury that almost any
stressful situation, from habitual gambling to a junk food
diet should be considered in assessing a person's
responsibility for his acts" (Newman & Rogers, 1983).

Given

the increased public awareness of, as well as public policy
recognition of the nature of and problems regarding stress,
the above definitely points in the direction of increased
psychiatric influence on the criminal justice system.
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The use of the term mens rea in the quote above about
diminished capacity, requires explanation.

At the outset of

this paper, mens rea was defined as guilty mind, or evil
mind, and certainly could not coexist with a determination
of insanity.

However, the term has now acquired, at least

in this country, a new and specialized meaning, wherein mens
rea is ''used to denote specific mental states that are
required, by the definitions of specific criminal offenses,
to accompany the acts that produce or threaten harm"
(Hermann, 1983, p. 111).

This shift in meaning represents a

change from a moral judgment to one that is morally neutral.
This · s viewed as a positive step by those who advocate the
doctrine of diminished capacity, wherein psychiatric
testimony d · rectly on mens rea, in terms such as purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, negligently, etc., is permitted.

But

it is clear that this process involves a marked departure
from the intent of most insanity defenses, and is not a
proper substitute for them.

''The defense of insanity ...

does not necessarily deny that the accused possessed the
mens rea incorporated in the definition of the offense
charged; rather, it is an overriding 'sui generis' defense
that is concerned not with what the actor did or believed
but with what kind of person he is" (Hermann, 1983, p. 13).
While this perhaps overstates the case, it does serve to
remind us of the essential moral element inherent in most
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insanity defenses, an element striking by its absence in the
legally neutral mens rea, or diminished capacity defenses.
It is clear that this morally neutral approach allows
for greater latitude in expert psychiatric testimony.

Since

the specialized definition of mens rea is inherent in
virtually all criminal statutes, as expressed in the concept
of criminal intent, the potential for greater psychiatric
influence in criminal court is obvious.

Indeed, "the

ultimate victory for those who desire the medical model
would be the total abolition of the traditional insanity
defense, and substitution of wide open psychiatric testimony
directly on mens rea" (Huckabee, 1980, p. 63).
One more test will be considered before concluding this
history of insanity.

I refer to the "justly responsible"

test, formulated by Judge Bazelon, an active figure in the
law/psychology interface.

The test states that "a defendant

is not responsible if at the time of his unlawful conduct
his mental and emotional processes or behavior controls were
impaired to such an extent that he cannot justly be held
resp on s i b 1 e for his act"

(Hermann , 19 8 3 , p. 5 6 ) •

Wh i 1 e in

some ways this test is a vast improvement over the others I
have discussed, it is of quite-limited utility.

It puts the

decision-making authority squarely in the hands of the jury,
where it rightly belongs, by avoiding language which would
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seem to require experts to assist in needed determinations,
and even to make decisions themselves.
what it needs to decide.

It tells the jury

Yet it doesn't provide a clue as

to how the decision should be arrived at.

Hermann (1983)

elaborates on the pros and cons:
A principle feature of the Bazelon formulation is
that it avoids any explicit reference to mental
disease or defect. This avoids the often
misleading formulations of psychiatric diagnosis
and nomenclature, and directs attention to the
critical question of whether the defendant lacked
understanding and the ability to make a meaningful
choice of action ... Under the justly responsible
standard the jury is given the power to redefine
the law in each case; the major defect of the
justly responsible standard is that it fails to
set a legal standard. (p. 58)
The above discussion of insanity is intended to provide
an essential background to an investigation of expert
psycholo ical testimony.

Several points bear repeating.

First and foremost, it cannot be emphasized too strongly
that "insanity is a legal matter, that is, a matter
involving social and moral values and principles, and not
simply a medical-scientific matter" (Neu, 1980, p. 82).
Second, the concepts of understanding and rationality seem
common to all insanity tests, either explicitly or
implicitly.

It is important to remember that these terms,

although used by mental health professionals, do not belong
to them, and are quite usable by and comprehensible to
average persons.

Finally, though I have criticized many
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insanity tests for unduly allowing the expansion of
psychiatric influence in court, it is important to note that
a good insanity defense will provide for a sense of balance
and perspective in criminal proceedings, in which mental
health professionals are involved.

"A fundamental reason

for the insanity defense is. to provide a legal framework to
aid the court, the jury and attorneys in evaluating the
testimony of psychiatrists and placing it in proper legal,
social and moral perspective" (Huckabee, 1980, p. 66).

CH APTER II
Law a nd Psychology
As a fi r s t st ep t owards examining the confusion that
exists at the psych o logy / l aw interface, we need first
e xamine the partic ul ar confusions that each field brings to
this juncture .

Since t he i nsa n it y defense is, as previously

stated , a legal st a ndar d, I wi ll be gi n wit h the law.
Ins a nity p r ovid e s for an ex c use from criminal
culpability.

But on wh a t , precisely, is this excuse based?

Moore (1980) outlines t he c ommonly understood bases:

"In

criminal law as in mo ra l s, tw o ge neral sorts of conditions
excuse:

ignorance th at i s not itself culpable, and

compulsion.

There ar e thu s basicall y two kinds of

traditional insanity t ests:

those based on the ignorance of

the mentally ill a cc used person; and those based on some
notion of hi s being c ompelled to act as he did" (p. 31).
This statement at f irs t appears to be both simply factual
a nd not at al l con t roversial.

M'Naghten would appear to be

a def ense ba se d on i g norance, while irresistible impulse
would appear to be virtually synonymous with compulsion.
However, upon close scrutiny, the relationships between
insanity and ignorance, and between insanity and compulsion,
do not hold up very well.

In point of fact, ignorance is,
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mo r e often than not, clearly insufficient for criminal
ex c ul pa t io n .

I am no less gu il ty of murder if I kill Jones

by mist a ke when I intended to kill Smith.

The law does not

a llow me to for ge t t ha t armed robbery is a crime, and if I
a t tack someone under t he mistaken belief that this person
means me harm , t hi s is sti l l an assault.

In short,

ignorance per se woul d not seem a good basis for an insanity
defense , yet this s eem s to directly conflict with the
apparently cl e a r cut re l a ti onship between ignorance and
insanity which test s s uc h as M'Naghte n apparently embody.
What then is t he proper relationship between ignorance and
responsibility?
Fingarett e a nd Hasse (19 79 ) prov i de a fascinating and
compelling analysi s of th is issue, preparatory to the
introduction of th e i r " Di sability of Mind" doctrine, which
will be expl ore d later.

What they suggest is that it is the

rel a ti onship bet ween ignorance and insanity, and not
ig nora nc e per se, that is of critical importance:
When we do al l ow exculpatory force to such a
back ground o f false beliefs, beliefs normally
i rr e levant to exculpation, what we require is
their rootedness in mental derangement. This
ex c ulpatory condition is distinctive and
essential, and is neither reducible to nor
translatable into terms of mistaken or false
beliefs, for these alone would NOT exculpate in
this context. It is the well that is poisoned,
not the cup. (p. 33)
In fact, the very notion of mistake seems to lose much of
its meaning without a presumption of rationality.

Without
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the capacity to be correct, to choose correctly, it seems
senseless to speak of being mistaken.

It is clear that, at

least in this context, mistake and madness are mutually
exclusive concepts, and the former, therefore, can hardly be
considered as good evidence for the latter:

"If the

insanity defense is to be reasoned about at all, then, it is
essential to see at the outset that it is likely to be a
distinctive defense whose real significance lies in its
contrast with such defenses as ignorance or mistake, that
presuppose the basic capacity for rational conduct''
(Fingarette & Hasse, 1979, p. 25).
Perhaps the insanity tests themselves deal with this
criticism insofar as they usually make reference to mental
disease or defect.

However, these concepts are fraught with

their own problems, and their use does not really challenge
the perception that it is ignorance, albeit perhaps an
extreme case of such, that exculpates.

The tests contain,

however badly worded or expressed, the essential concepts
necessary for understanding the exculpatory basis for the
insanity defense.

They simply fail to express the proper

relationship between them, and so proper emphasis is
misplaced:

"In summary, the basic truth about the 'not

knowing' and •not appreciating' clauses is that they do not
in themselves express an ultimately exculpatory ground.
Rather, they in turn derive such exculpatory significance as
they do have in the insanity context from the reference back
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to their source in mental disability, in the more radical
condition of mind that amounts to impairment of capacity for
rational control of conduct" (Fingarette & Hasse, 1979,
p. 43).
Fingarette and Hasse apply a similar analysis to the
concept of compulsion.

Aside from the perhaps insoluble

problem of distinguishing an irresistible impulse from an
impulse that is not resisted, it is clear that compulsion,
per se, provides little, if any insight into "insane"
criminal conduct.

"Viewed from the standpoint of involun-

tariness as strictly conceived in criminal law, the conduct
one sees in insanity seems to me a model of 'voluntary'
conduct.

It is (typically) purposeful, intentional and

effectively executed; it is often premeditated, planned and
prepared" (fingarette & Hasse, 1979, p. 15).

Crudely put,

the "insane" killer wanted his victim to be dead, and
obviously accomplished this.

This is not to say that the

killer may not rightfully be deemed insane, only that lack
of voluntariness is a concept that is insufficient for
arriving at that judgment.

This assimilation of insanity to

involuntariness finds its origins in dubious, complicated
and obscure connections, and is therefore likely to continue
to be a troublesome issue at the law/psychology interface.
And so we see that although insanity defenses appear to
be, and function as if they are truly based on the
traditional defenses of ignorance and compulsion, they are,
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in fact, attempting to deal with a more profound truth, with
a level of understanding that at once contains and
transcends such particulars as ignorance and compulsion.
Sadly, however, and perhaps only because of the deceptive
simplicity with which these specifics present themselves,
the larger, more significant but more difficult concept of
rationality is deprived of the primary consideration it
merits in determinations of insanity.

Based as it is upon a

lon g , historical tradition, this problem of improper
emphasis, which is now a major point of confusion which the
law brings to the law/psychology interface, will be
d i fficult to overcome.
I have used the term responsibility before.

In fact,

this paper began by defining insanity as an excuse from
criminal responsibility.

However, the term can be, and is,

used in different ways in different contexts, so some
clarification is in order.

Moore (1980) explains the

retrospective use of the term, which is the operative usage
in the context of insanity:

"We hold people responsible for

certain events in the past.

We make such 'ascriptions of

responsibility' based on a host of criteria, involving
concepts of causation, intention, voluntariness and action,
and matters of justification or excuse" (p. 25).
definition is useful for two reasons.

This

Firstly, it correctly

asserts that responsibility is an ascription - not a fact,
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no t a scientifi c question, not a problem of right and
wr ong - bu t q u i te sim ply a j udgment or evaluation that all
s o rt s o f people have always made about all sorts of other
people .

Secondl y, i n show i ng that there are numerous

c r iteria that may be c onsidered in ascribing responsibility,
it s trongly sugge s t s why

th~

term is so variously used.

People are fr e e t o ascr i be as they wish, and given the
variety of criteria th ey ma y consider, it is not at all
surprisin

th a t id e a s o f what co nstitutes being responsible

often differ signifi ca ntly .

It is not surprising, for

e xample, that on e perso n will co nsider a particular
lawbreaker as clearly res ponsib l e and guilty of a crime,
while the next will cons i der him as equally clearly
no -responsible and ins a ne .

Ne ther person is inherently

right or wrong; ea ch is simply, for reasons involving
personality, experi ence, c ulture, etc., making a different,
a nd perhap s, e qual l y valid ascription.
Howeve r , thi s pro c ess does not translate into court
ve r y well (re c a ll Bazelon's justly responsible test).
J u r i e s ca nno t make up the law as they go along.

Fortu-

nately, the law has endeavored, if not always successfully,
to develop a more consistent ascription of responsibility,
based upon a much more limited set of criteria.
to the prepotent criterion, understanding.

I turn now
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Understanding is another term which, like
responsibility, defies simple and even singular definition.
Again, understanding is properly viewed as a term of
ascription.

Furthermore, the term is illuminated by the

relationship that exists between ascriptor and ascriptee.
11

0nly if we can see a nother being as one who acts to achieve

some intelligibl

end in light of some rational beliefs will

we understand him in the same fundamental way that we
understand ourselves and our fellow men in everyday life"
(Moore, 1980, p. 61).

This makes clear the fact that a

determination that someone lacks, or does not lack understanding is a complex and social procedure, involving
elements of individual psychology, social and moral
judgment.

Of course, this process is well suited to a court

of law, where conflicts between individual and society are
resolved, and moral judgment s are constantly made.

This

should remind us that whereas specific aspects of understanding, or rationality, may be singled out for scrutiny
and evaluation by professional social scientists, these
reductions are not the same as, and are no substitute for,
the lar er and richer concept of understanding, replete with
its philosophical and sociological components.
Having acquired a clearer sense of the concept of
understanding, we can now examine its relationship to
responsibility, of which it is a primary constituent.

"The
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Renaissance idea of individuality and the Enlightenment's
emphasis on understanding as a precondition for responsibility combine to provide the essential preconditions for
criminal pu ishment, i.e., individual responsibility.

The

insanity defense developed in the modern period as a device
for precluding criminal responsibility where the mental
condition of a defendant was such that he lacked understanding" (Hermann, 1983, p. vi).

In short, where there is

no understa ding there is equally no responsibility.

It

wou d also seem to follow that when there is decreased or
limited understanding, there should be a corresponding
diminu ion of ascribed responsibility, and, therefore,
criminality.
We also need to keep in mind that there is no automatic
relationship between mental disturbance and deficits in
understandi g:

"The significant issue, then, is not whether

an individual suffered from some form of mental illness but
whether, as a result of a mental illness, the person lacked
understanding and control of his actions at the time he
acted" (Hermann, 1983, p. 8).

While the reference to mental

illness actually confounds the issue, the statement is
sufficiently awkward to illustrate the difficulty in trying
to articulate the relationship between understanding, or
rationality on the one hand, and ignorance and involuntariness on the other.

The former terms form the context in
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which the latter ones operate.

Ignorance and involuntari-

ness lose their meaning when divorced from the more
fundamental, more meaningful, and perhaps more human concept
from which they spring.

I turn now to another confounding

construct, namely mental illness.
The concept of mental illne ss is an integral part of
the concept of insanity.

All insanity tests in current use

make expl . cit reference to mental illness (or mental
disease, or mental defect, etc.).

Of course, this reference

to mental illness both facilitates and sustains the use of
psychologists as expert witnesses in court.

However, no

insanity test specifies precisely what is meant by mental
illness, or even elaborates on meaningful criteria.
it is

Rather,

resented as a given, as a unitary, precise and

accepted concept about which the psychological community has
achieved consensus.

It is presumed t o be a matter not

analagous to, but coequal to physical illness.

In short,

mental illness is considered to be a matter of fact, a fact
about which experts may be expected to provide specialized
information and insight.

Just how valid is this assessment?

Leifer (1964), in an analysis akin to Moore's earlier
remarks about responsibility, challenges the "factual"
nature of mental illness:

"Neither 'intention' not 'mental

disease' are facts, but are ascriptive terms like
responsibility .•. The determination that a defendant has
mental illness is based on certain facts about his behavior,
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and is therefore, let us be clear, not an additional fact,
but a name for a class of facts" (p. 829).

Writing over 20

years ago, Leifer seems to have foreseen the ascending
position of the concept of mental illness in insanity
considerations, and his criticism is now more than ever well
taken, at least as an attempt at balancing the now almost
uncritical acceptance of this concept.

On the other hand,

t is critique does little more than illustrate the
distinction between physical and functional disorders, a
distinction which, in and of itself, has little relevance
to, and holds no interest for criminal justice.

However,

u on furt er investigation, we arrive at more complex and compelling issues of science and philosophy, issues largely
ignored by criminal justice, and poorly understood when they
are considered.
so much th

In short, we shall discover that it is not

concept of mental illnes s that poses problems

for the court system, but rather its rootedness in a social
science which, in many ways and perhaps almost by
definition, translates quite poorly to the legal arena.
This idea will be explored shortly, but first I need turn to
an important aspect of mental illness, about which people
have had their "facts" straight for a very long time.
I have been using the term mental illness in its
primarily technical and professional sense (or senses).
Despite the many and varied uses and meanings it has, mental
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illness is a central concept in all the social sciences.
However, it is also a concept which the population at large
has used, in one way or another, for centuries.

Further,

the popular concept has remained relatively stable,
consistent and consensual to this date.

"Our ancient

paradigm of mental illness .•. is reserved for those gross
deviations from intelligibility we still capture with the
more
'h

evere statements,
is mad.•

'he is crazy ,' or 'he is insane,' or

These notions capture the essential notion of

the ancient conception of mental illness as madness; that
mentally ill people are different from us in ways that we
find hard to understand"

(Moore, 1980, p. 60).

Once again

we see the centrality of the concept of rationality, both as
a criterion for ascribing responsibility, and also as a
significant process within those doing the ascribing.

Once

again we see the determination of insanity to be a social
and moral procedure.

Moore (1980) elaborates on the

criteria involved in the "popular" conception of mental
illness:

"There is an old, socially-sanctioned, well

established set of views which supports the identification
of mental illness only with the violent, extreme psychoses,
and within this context of ideas, mental illness emerges as
the ultimate catastrophe that can happen to a human being"
(p. 61).

These views are contemporary as well as

historical , and are in fact the bases for many insanity
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tests.

Indeed, Moore goes on to point out that ''each of

these tests is best viewed as an attempt to adjust the then
prevailing views about mental illness to well established
moral and legal paradigms of excuses from responsibility''
p. 31).

•

is!

One might well ask at this point where the problem

We have seen that the prevailing views about mental

illness have been relatively constant, and legal paradigms
generally exhibit a similar constancy.
major proble1

I suggest that a

has arisen due to the substitution of a

technical and professional meaning of mental illness for the
popular and historical usage just discussed.

When Moore

(1980) says that ''mental illness has for centuries been a

concept dealt with by the law because it negates, in some

way or another or to some degree, the basic postulate of
responsibility on which the law rests" (p. 25), he is
clearly referring to the popular usage, a meaning which
virtually implies a tautological relationship between mental
illness and insanity.

Further, this meaning recognizes, and

indeed compels us to recognize the social and moral nature
of the concept of mental illness, and leads us to an
understanding of insanity that is non-technical, and not
professionalized.

"Mental disease, at least in relation to

criminal insanity and responsibility, is not a purely
medical notion.

It is not a matter simply for experts to

decide; it involves the sorts of questions of social and
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ethical value that ordinary lay people who serve on juries
have equal competence to consider'' (Neu, 1980, p. 86).
However, it is clear that this is not the sense of mental
illness used by most mental health professionals, nor is it
much in evidence in the court system.

Rather, it has been

superseded by a more technical and professional meaning(s),
a meaning that though perhaps useful and fruitful for
purposes of psychology, poses significant problems for the
legal system.

I turn now to this professionalized usage of

mental illness, and to a consideration of how it and its
rootedness in social science greatly confounds issues at the
interface.
If the popular usage of mental illness entails a social
and moral determination, then the professionalized usage
entails a scientific one.

It is largely due to the presumed

scientific nature of their endeavor that mental health
experts have achieved status as expert witnesses.

As such,

they can provide the court with factual data pertaining to
mental illness.

But how factual are the facts?

scientific is the endeavor?

How

Part of the answer is suggested

by the generally agreed upon idea that the medical model of
madness provides the framework for discussing and evaluating
mental disorders.

Instructive here is the fact that we are

dealing with a medical model, not medicine, an analogy and
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not the thing itself.

Perhaps then, we are also dealing

with an analogy of science, and not science itself?
Robinson (1980) points out that "for an undertaking to
be scientific, it must frame its explanations in terms of
universal laws, which is to say that it must be in
possession of such laws'' (p. 23).

The social sciences, the

mental health sciences, do not appear to be in possession of
such laws.

For one thing, psychology's insights and

understandings are largely statistical in nature.

This is

to say that we know much about the aggregate, but little for
certain about particular individuals.
and one

Two parts hydrogen

art oxygen w·11 always produce water, but human

individuals are not nearly as predictable as molecules.
Further ev·dence is suggested by the fact that science
attempts to explain by utilizing causes, while psychology
more often refers to reasons.

These two terms are not

properly interchangeable, and attempts to do so result in
serious confusion.

Causes always have effects, and so are

experimentally manipulable.

Reasons, however, in referring

to mental or logical processes, are more elusive, debatable,
and somewhat limited in terms of predictive utility.

Of

course, matters of psychophysiology, psychopharmocology,
nutrition, etc., are areas where causes may be properly
considered, but then these areas have at least as much to do
with medicine, with the traditionally understood sciences,
as with psychology.

In short, the social sciences "form a
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separate class of inquiries, and the separation lingers no
matter how many of the methods, concepts or findings they
might borrow from genuinely scientific undertakings''
(Robinson, 1980, p. 26).
I do not mean to

su~gest

that psychology is not a

science, and its introduction into court therefore
inappropriate.
even a

In fact, when considered unto it elf, or

part of the larger system of social science,

psycho o y would appear to meet many of the criteria for
scientific endeavor.
psy

For example, a well-constructed

hological experiment will conform to the same sorts of

standards and practices as will one in physics.
psychology

Further,

as achieved numerous and important insights and

understanding across the entire spectrum of human
experience.

Nonetheless, it must be conceded that

psychology, regardless of its success, or the exte nt to
whic

it employs the scientific method, is a breed apart

from traditional science.

Consequently, many of its

concepts need to be considered as differing in kind, not
just degree, from the more traditional counterparts.

Shah

(1969) considers this in discussing th e concept at hand:

It appears, then, that in contrast to the fairly
specific objective and precise criteria for
determining physical dis ease, the criteria and
norms used in defin in mental disease are neither
specific nor objective, nor are they separable
from a multitude of ethical and social considerations inherent in the labeling process. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the term 'mental disease'
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is of t en a pplie d in a somew h at indiscriminate way
to a mot ley coll e ct i on of interpersonal and social
be ha vio rs, ju dg e d dev i ant according to varying
s c hol og · cal a nd cu l t ur a norms used by persons
ap ying such l ab el s.
Und erstandably, therefore,
t e defini t ion s t e d t o be vague and are often
remarkably cir c ula r a nd lack ing in un iformity and
r iabi lit . It wou ld seem that the term 'mental
disease ' s a ctually use d in a metaphorical sense
o ref e r to a var · ety of s oci al a nd psychological
maladjustme ts and r elated huma n proble ms ... The
term seems at times to.b e use d as a ready explanat · o
or a most any type o f be h a vior that does
no make se se , r evea ls no c lea r or reasonable
mo
io
or distu r bs our s en s ibili ties. ( p. 24 )
s
menta

i

Ho we

o ar ue ag a inst th e value or utility of

ness as a sci e n t ific conc ept.
c

s ci ent ·

ot

For social

ur oses , i s sim · arity t o mo re standard

c co c ptual ' zation ism r e t h a n sufficient.

r

s

rou

r icul arl

e dea or ,

non - cient · ic , t ha
tradi · o a
u derstan i

i s interaction wi th other fields of
fi e lds t hat are de c idedly
t e si n if ic a nt differences from

sc ence com e to the f o re and pose problems of
Ro bin s on ( 198 0 ) , elab o rating on his earlier

remarks about un · ve rsa l l aws, points out that in law:
a c uitt a l is base d on reasonable proof that the
d isease was releva n tly c onnected to the act, and
was not me re ly c oextensive with it. What is
r ui r ed i s con vi nc in g proof that the overwhelming
r ajo r it y o f huma n be i ngs, were they similarly
affect ed, co uld be plaus i bly expected to commit
th a c t of which the personal stands accused.
Th i s is to say that we require proof that the act
wa s go ve rn e d by nothing less than a law of nature.
( p.

61)

Except for matters of brain physiology and chemistry,
psycholo g y possesses few, if any, laws of nature (Robinson,
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1980).

But this would be but a minor problem if only it

were recognized.

Instead, the substitution of the

specialized meanings of mental illness, those used by
professionals in psychiatry and psychology, for the long
standing societal meanings has gone largely unnoticed.
Further ore, this shift in meanings, which both constitutes
and represe . ts the ascendance of the medical model of
insan ' ty within the criminal justice system, is at once a
cause and effect of increased psychiatric activity in the
courtroom:

"An important, if subtle, consequence of

psychiatric involvement has been the gradual introduction of
a medical model in place of the law's efforts to articulate
legally relevant criteria.
has bee

The cost of this substitution

co fusion of purpose" (Dershowitz, 1968, p. 29).

The problem, then, is not that psychology is not a bona
fide scie ce wherein, accordingly, mental illness is not a
legitimate concept.

Rather, in refusing to recognize, much

less clarify, the essential differences between physical and
mental illnesses, psychology has allowed itself to answer
questions it cannot answer, and indeed should not even be
asked.

For example, the post-diction of mental states by

experts is at best a dubious proposition.

Further, such

post-diction becomes more problematical when it opens the
door to testimony on such non-psychological issues as
culpability and responsibility.

The ascendance of the

medical model, with its reliance on the mental illness
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concept, has confused both judges and juries, and distracted
them from their primary task of evaluating and resolving
disputes between individuals and society, disputes which
involve essentially moral and social ct siderations.

So

long as juries are not informed about the special, unique
nature of such "facts" as mental illness, and so long as
mental illness remains an integral part of insanity
statutes, continued confusion will result.

Moore (1980)

reminds us of the essential task of the jury: "If criminal
law · s to reflect our shared notions of culpability, an
excuse from punishment based on those moral notions ought to
utilize those same moral criteria.

The only question

appropriate to juries is thus one appealing to their moral
paradigm of mental · 11ness:

Is the accused so irrational as

to be non-responsible?" ( p. 62).
To th · s point, I have discussed a number of conflicts
and controversies that operate at the law/psychology
interface.

A question that naturally arises is whether

these conflicts are deep-seated and inherent in the
interface, or are just practical, albeit complicated matters
that we could reasonably hope to resolve.
suggests that the former is the case.

Sadly, analysis

At its most basic

level, the law operates on an assumption of free will.

It

has always been such, and indeed it is hard to imagine how
the law could function without a presumption of individual
free agency.

Psychology, on the other hand (and
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µ rti ular l y the p yc h logy of the medi ca l mo del),
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In fact,

t e insanity def e ns e may be viewed as

the fund mental expression of this c onfl ic t .

Stone (1975 )

concl udes that ''the i ns a ni ty defense is the contrad i ctor y
juncture between a deterministic mo dern theory of causes of
action , and an en du r ing t he or y of the morality of action.
c o ncl ude that t he con "' r ad ic t ion is insoluble, because t he
e p i s t. e n1 o l o g i c a 1 s t r u \,.; tu r e s r i s e on d i ff ere n t found a t i on s 11
( p.

2 27 ) .

I
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Several particular examples of this contradiction may
serve to illuminate some of the confusion existing at the
interface.

One concerns the opposite kinds of decision

rules employed by the law and psychology, rules which both
give substance to and amplify the essential incompatibi lity
between free will and determinism.
The basic legal decision rule in criminal law
states;
' he in doubt , acquit.' The general
ru le in medicine may be stated as follows:
'When
in doubt, continue to suspect illness.' There is
a fa"rl common set, not only in psychiatrists,
but also in clinic 1 psychologist s, psychiatric
social workers and psychiatric nurses, to look for
signs of psychopathology and maladjustment.
( S ah,. 19 6 9 ,. p. 26 )
This helps to show how a specific act, by a specific
i

dividua , can be viewed so disparately by two different

fields

These fields reflect two different viewpoints, and

stem from two very different, and basically different, ways
of making sense of the world.

This poses no problem when

each field stays within its particular confines.

But put in

the same room (i.e., a courtroom), the conflict becomes
apparent and troublesome.
Another aspect of this conflict becomes apparent in
contrasting the treatment orientation of psychology with the
punishment model employed by the criminal justice system.
psychologist is quite properly concerned with a specific
client's psychological dysfunction in particular, and this
client's overall welfare in general, while the court is
primarily interested in an accused person's particular

A
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criminally relevant action, and the larger issue of the
relationship bet ween that a ction an d soc i et y .
these two orientations do not mesh wel l .

Once again,

''The treatment and

welfare orientation of psychiatri s t s is a major factor in
the continuing problems of c r imin a l law and psychiatry.

The

interests of justice are, to a signific ant extent, limited
by the treatment-oriented feelin gs of psychiatrists, rather
than the law' (Huckabee, 1980, p . 8) .

Th is is to suggest

that mental health professionals , whe n appearing in court in
their professional capacities, a r e to a certain extent
bringing along their own rules, and resisting the use of
others.

Twenty years ago Judge Wa r re n Burger (1964) said he

had ''heard psyc iatrists frankly sa y that if they conclude
that their patient is ill and in need of treatment, they
consider it their professional oblig ation to try to make
certain that he goes to a ment a l i ns t itution rather than a
prison, even if it is ne c e ssar y t o 'tailor' their expert
testimony to accomplish that end " ( p . 7 ).
This conflict bet ween t r ea t ment and punishment
orientation is clea r ly ev ident in considering evidentiary
standar ds .

While usef ul evidence may properly be obtained

fr om a wi d e va r ie ty of sources, the court is in no way
ob l ig ated to use this evidence in the same way as it is used
by the s ource professionals providing it.

"While medical

evidence, including medical diagnostic criteria, is
certainly relevant for making a determination about
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capacity, it is unlikely that the same conceptual criteria
used for determining need of care and treatment will be
congruent with the criteria used to determine capacity for
conforming conduct" (Hermann, 1983, p. 129).

Simply put,

while an individual may meet all the diagnostic criteria to
un uestionably merit a determination of psychopathology,
there is no parallel, necessary relationship between the
sarn

ev·dence, when used in court, and any legal

conclusion.

As has often been mentioned, insanity is not a

ps chiatric concept, and so ttere exist no diagnostic
criteria for it.

u

hile psychopathologi cal diagnosis might

suff ·c e for the mental health profes sional, what the law
requi es is a social and moral determination that the person
·n questio

is so fundamentally different from others by

virtue of his or her craziness that he or she cannot be
considered a normal person to whom the usual rules apply"
(Morse, 1978, p. 392).
Once a ain, the decidedly non-scientific nature of
insanity determinations is revealed.

We need to keep

reminding ourselves that although science can illuminate
many of the aspects of human existence, it cannot answer,
and certainly not by itself, moral questions.

This in no

way suggests that psychology cannot or should not provide
information to the court relating to considerations of
insanity, but only that the experts should not draw final
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conclusions.

Szasz (1984) quite accurately summarizes these

concerns:
T e fact is that the distinction between
disturbance and depravity - between madness and
badness, between mental illness and criminality,
call it what you will - is not a specialized or
technical judgment doctors can make because they
possess a medical degree; or psychiatrists can
make because they possess training in diagnosing
ad treatin mental illness ... The distinction is a
'moral judgment, ' which is why a jury, and no one
else, is supposed to make it. (p. 148)
The preceding has been an attempt to

explo~e

and

exp icate some of the conflicts between the law and
psychology, conflicts of both basic principles and practical
orien ation.
minor

However, these confli cts are reduced to only

roportions when the two systems are viewed as

parallel, if not similar, institutional mechanisms for
achieving social harmony.

Bromberg (1979) focuses on the

similarities between the two fields in his analysis:
Both law and psychiatry, in spite of their
differences in conceptualization, procedures and
techniques, seek to codify, understand and correct
human misbehavior through punishment, rehabilitation and psychotherapy, respectively. Viewed
broadly, the law codifies misbehavior in terms of
the degree of the crime, while psychiatry codifies
maladaptation in terms of diagnosis. The law aims
to assess responsibility for misbehavior, i.e.
crime, through the concept of intent, specific or
general; psychiatry aims to assess the genesis of
criminal action via study of the criminal's mental
conflicts and personality trends. The law's goal
is to modify behavior through punishment,
rehabilitation ... ; psychiatry's goal is to modify
misbehavior through medical therapy or psychotherapy. The justification for law is the
attainment of justice in our socio-economic
milieu; the justification for psychiatry is
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balancing the individual's bio-psycho-social
system. Both disciplines represent attempts at a
kind of social engineering. (p. 3)
While it is clear that both the law and psychiatry, at
times and in part, assume functions which may usefully be
considered as furthering social engineering purposes, to
characterize each field as such is unwarranted.

For one

thing, most mental health professionals, and I suppose most
legal people, would reject the idea that their primary
function is social engineering .

Bromberg's conception of

psychiatry is rather narrow, certainly not universal, and
largely outdated, stressin
i norin

sue

important y,

as it does adaptation, while

factors as growth and change.

More

· t is clear that the maj ority of people seen by

psychiatrists do not misbehave, certainly not in a legally
relevant sens .

Indeed, those deemed mentally disturbed

show no greater inclination to criminality than does the
population at large (Morse, 1978).

Finally, in ignoring the

important distinctions between the two fields, Bromberg
seems to suggest that greater integration is desirable and
easily attained, which in fact suggests increasing
psy hiatric influence in court.
A similar predisposition to increase psychiatric
influence in court may be seen in the suggestion "that
persons currently labeled 'criminal' and persons currently
labeled 'mentally ill' should be exposed to the same kind of
judicial decision-making process.

Different directions
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would be taken only after the decision to deprive the person
of his rights had been reached" (Penn, Stover, Giebink and
Si ndberg, 1969, p. 11).

This idea, which clearly aims at

eliminating the insanity defense as we know it, shares with
Bromberg an implicit belief that a jury of peers is
insufficient, or unqualifie?, to make the needed judgments.
It is this kind of thinking which underlies the increased
involvement of mental health professionals in court.

I have

thus far tried to show how this thinking is based on
confusion and error, and to suggest that what appears to be
progressive attempts at improving our criminal justice
system have actually subverted some of its most basic
tenets, and put the whole system in peril.

This will become

clearer in the final part of this paper, when the specifics
of expert psychological testimony are examined.

Neu (1980)

provides the moral that I have tried to illustrate in this
part:

nwhat may seem an enlightened and humane movement for

reform, may in fact constitute an assault, a dangerous
assault, on freedom and dignity" (p. 100).

CHAPTER III
Psychologists in Court
Having examined some of t he social, moral, legal and
psychological issues relevant to the law/psychology
interface, and having attained some insight into the
origins,

·ntent and meaning of ins an ity tests, it is now

time to turn to a consideration of psychologists' actual
conduct i

criminal courtrooms , particularly those where

insanity defenses are being employed.
number of roles in criminal justice:

Psychologists fill a
they play a major part

in determ · nations of competency to stand trial, they offer
predictions of dangerousness for certain defendants, and
they file am·cus curiae (friend of the court) briefs to
provide the court with information needed for meaningful
adjudication of particular cases, generally through such
organizations as the American Psychological Association
(Kolasa, 1972).
Most importantly for purposes of this paper,
psychologists serve as expert witnesses, for both the
defense and the prosecution, in trials where an insanity
defense has been offered.

Kolasa (1972) provides a working

definition of an expert witness:

11

An expert witness must be

able to deduce correctly from hypothetical facts related to
some profession, science or occupation beyond the scope of
57
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the average layman and must have the knowledge, skill or
experience in that area to help the triers of fact in
his/their decisions" (p. 502).
present themselves.

Two questions immediately

First, is psychology even relevant to

·nsanity defense considerations?

Second, is expert

psychological testimony genuinely helpful to the jury?

One

must cone ude that these questions are presumed to be
answerable in the affirmative, given the relative lack of
attention they receive from profe ssionals in this area.
· Indeed while the literature abounds with material which
instructs on how to be a better expert witness or how to
better deal wit

opposing expert testimony, there has been

relatively little comment on the proper role, much less the
mere propriety, of expert psychological testimony.

Gass

(1981), in reviewing a study of the law/psychology
interfac , also notes this unfortunate phenomenon:
The chapter devoted to the expert witness is
disappointing in sofar as it skirts the fundamental
issue of what the psychological expert's role in
the courtroom 'ought' to be. As psychologists
enter their seventh decade as expert witnesses in
the U.S., a few scholars have begun to challenge
the utility of psychological techniques and
testimony in resolving certain legal issues. The
authors ..• pay scant attention to the question of
whether the science of psychology, in general, is
sufficiently accurate to justify its acceptance by
courts as reliable and valid scientific evidence.
(p. 339)
So even though the existence and practice of expert
psychological testimony is tacitly approved of by the
psychological community 2 , the questions asked above are

59
still open ones, answ er ab l e i n a wi de variety of ways.
Responses ra nge fr om ban i s hment of ps ychologists from court,
to g iving pre e minence to psyc hol o gical evaluations over
legal determi nations .

The re mainder of this paper consists

largely of a n exp lora t io n of these various responses, with
an aim towards elucid a ting what t he role of the psychological expert o ught to be, i f in fact psychologists are
worthy of expert status i n th e first place.
The particip a ti on o f ps yc hologists in insanity cases
has come to be consid ere d a s bot h necessary and natural.
Bromberg (1979) explain s t he pr ed o mi nant viewpoint when he
states t at '' interfer e nce with r e sponsibility for crime
re uire

psyc iatric ev a lu a ti on to aid the court in

unraveling such kaleidoscopic k i nds of huma n behavior"
(p. 59).

However , this s eemin gly neutral explanation for

expert psychiatric testimo ny in fact begs the question,
insofar as no ju s tif ica t ion for the "requirement" is
offered.

In tr u th , th e be h avior of all people, disturbed or

not, is more o r le ss eq uall y kaleidoscopic, yet psychological testimo ny i s deemed irrelevant to most criminal
proce e dings .

Furth e r, the indisputable fact that insanity

def enses pr e da t e the modern sc i ences of psychology and
psy c h i atry ar g ues against the "necessity" of expert
psy c hologi c al test i mony.

I am by no means disputing the

propriety of having psychologists in court, only the view
that they are necessary to the process.

In fact, it is
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conceivable that an insanity case could be tried without
experts at all (though I know of no such case).
Nonetheless, psychologists are in court because defense
attorneys ask them to support their clients' claims of
insanity, and also because prosecutions need their own
experts to refute those of the defense.

Given the

obliga ions of a defense to do all it can on behalf of its
cl · ent,

s

ractice appears legitimate and acceptable

(although a ain, not necessary) .

However, this legitimacy

has been c allenged on the grounds that the testimony
psychologists offer does not merit expert status.
One line of attack upon expert psychological testimony
is based upo

the wide variety of such testimony that

appear , finding its ultimate expression in the by now
well-known courtroom battles of opposing psychological
exper s.

The question asked is how can a true science offer

two opposing views simultaneously?

Of course experts from

many fields disagree, and this does not in itself diminish
the legitimacy of providing expert testimony.

However, this

issue can be seen as part of the controversy over the
scientific nature of psychology, as discussed in Chapter II.
At that time, it was suggested that psychology could
rightfully and usefully be considered as science, albeit
science with a difference.

But for many, this difference is

deemed too large to represent merely a difference in degree.
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It is viewed as a

diffe~ence

sc i e nc e and non-science.

in kind, the difference between

And indeed, the wide variety of

exp e rt t e s t i mony that even a single case may elicit is more
e asily unde r s tood within a non-scientific context.

Newman

and Rog ers ( 1983 ), non-scientists both, offer that
"psychology a nd psy c hi atry are a conglomeration of
speculat · ve theori es, and ge nerally the theory that a
particular psychia tr i s t wil l

~h oose

other th a n sc ie nt if i c validation.

is chosen for reasons
He likes the sound or

fee , or t he way the theory works for him."

The various

'camps" in psychology do not spend much of their time
accusin

each other o f be i ng wrong, yet these camps stem

from widely div er ge nt theoretical positions, and result in
equally diverse pract ices.

Psychiatrist Leifer (1964)

arrives at a simil ar conclusion:

"It is a fact that the

psy hiatrist i s usi ng his personal judgment, and not that
psychiat r y i s a youn g or inexact science, that explains the
notorio us d is a g r ee me nts between psychiatrists in courtroom
proc e dures" ( p. 8 27) .
Rob i nson (1980) is another who challenges the presumed
s c ientifi c nature of psychology, and in so doing even
excludes the possibility of meaningful expert testimony:
At present, given the nature of law as a n
institution and given the state of t he •social
sciences,' there can be no meaning attached to the
term 'expert testimony' as that term is used in
connection with the insanity defense. There is no
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science of 'mental disease.' All that •expertise'
can refer to here is a textbook knowledge of tests
of doubtful validity, and a clinical knowledge of
some of the eccentricities of the human mind. By
none of the historical standards does crime qua
crime qualify as a 'disease.' By none of the
historical scientific standards does psychiatric
or psychological testimony qualify as •evidence,'
since such testimony does not confine itself
publicly verifiable facts. (p. 63)
Robinson's conclusion represents one extreme position on
this is ue, yet his argument is well-taken, and could
usefully be considered as an attempt at balancing what has
been a largely uncritical acceptance of expert psychological
testimony.

One problem with the argument is the repeated

allusion to "historical standards."

These standards are by

no means cast in stone, and might reasonably be expected to
ev lv

and adapt to changing times.

The reference to

"publicly verifiable facts" is important, but is simply
refle tive of Robinson's "non-scientific" critique, and in
no way extends the argument.
The question remains:

Is psychology science, or not

science, or science but different?

The answer is debatable,

but the question may in fact be academic, or even
irrelevant.

Whether good science or bad science or

something else entirely, psychology as a field of endeavor,
as a repository of immense amounts of information about
human beings, is clearly the best available source of
information about human behavior.

Psychologists may know
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less about human behavior than dermatologists know about
sk i n, but no one knows more about human behavior than ·
p syc holo ists.

The game may be primitive and sometimes

conf u sing , but it is the only game in town, and psychologists would see m entitled to expert status, if only by
default .

Be sid e s , al l of these arguments seem based on a

faulty assumpti o n , namel y that expert testimony needs to be
scient.fic .

Recalli ng the generic definition of expert

testimony provided e ar l ie r , this is simply not true.
Profe ssional t r ade or ga ni zations, among others, provide
ex ert witnesses wi t ho ut makin g any claim to being
scientific .
The fo lo wing remarks by Ziskin (1975) are worth citing
at len th for s ev e r al reasons.

They clearly summarize the

"non - sci e nc " arg ume nt against expert psychological
te s timo ny .

They a lso provide some insight into a practical

and ver y r eal bas i s for appreciating the use, growth and
acce ptance o f su c h testimony.

Finally, it inadvertantly

pr ovid es a means of understanding, possibly even resolving,
th e co n fusion centered on this issue:
Despite the ever increasing utilization of
psychiatric and psychological evidence in the
le ga l process, such evidence frequently does not
meet reasonable criteria for admissibility and
should not be admitted in a court of law and, if
admitted, should be given little or no weight.
It
is unfortunate that because of the need of the
courts for the assistance they hope these
•experts' can provide, because of the requirement
that attorneys use any means legally available to
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advance the cause of their clients, and because of
the ignorance or unwillingness to face facts on
the part of the experts involved, such testimony
continues to be accorded scientific status. In
the light of current scientific evidence, there is
no reason to consider such testimony as other than
highly speculative. (p. 1)
Ziskin subverts, albeit understandably, his own argument
when he refers to the "scientific status" of expert
test · mony.

He clearly misses the point.

He implies that

the judgment of psychology by science is the critical issue,
when the real issue is the law's judgment of psychology
which, as discussed above, need not involve considerations
of science at all.

This can be explained by again returning

to the medical model.

Psychology's adoption of this model

would imply a science parallel to medical science.

As the

scientific nature of psychology is disputed, the power of
the med'cal model to impart legitimacy upon psychology is
concomitantly reduced.

Psychology thereby becomes less

attractive as a source of expert testimony.
In summary, psychology has developed a bit of a public
relations problem, largely brought upon itself.

There is

irony in the fact that the "medical" part of medical model
allowed psychology to gain acceptance in court, while the
"model" part has now virtually turned on psychology and
exposed its limitations.

Nonetheless, expert psychological

witnesses have been available to the courts for some time,
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and should continue to be so.

Besides, it will shortly

become clear that the significant contentious issue is not
psychology in court, but the specific testimony that
psychologists often offer, testimony that often bears little
relationship to psychological practice.

In brief, expert

psychological testimony would be far less controversial if
it were limited to matters psychological.
P ychologists are experts in psychology, and that is
w at they should talk about.

parameters:

Neu (1980) suggests some basic

''What one wants from expert witnesses in an

insanity defense trial is testimony about the nature and
causes of any psycholog·cal incapacities from which an
individual may suffer.

Diagnostic labels and clinical

conclusions are less important than the details on which
they are based'' (p. 87).

The point about labels and

conclusions cannot be overstressed.

Such may not only

confuse both judges and juries, but as will be seen later,
may actually impede juries in making their own connections
and drawing their own conclusions.

However, if psycho-

logical testimony stayed within the confines of Neu's
suggestion, there would likely be little controversy over
it.

But a problem immediately arises when we recognize that

the only incapacities that matter were those existing in the
past, sometimes the distant past, when the specific crimes
occured.

It is one thing to testify about a current mental

state; it is quite another to discuss a state of mind
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tha t existed months, perhaps years in the past, and often
well be f ore the expert witness examined the accused.

This

re t rospective analysis is risky at best, and such testimony
i s r igh tfu ll y open to dispute.
pr esen te d by Zis k in (in Newman

Such disputation is clearly
&

Rogers, 1983):

"Forensic

psychiat r i s ts i n my opinion have misled the judiciary, the
legislature and the ge neral public into believing that they
have t e capacity t o a c c urately assess somebody's mental
state mo ths prior to ever having seen them, when in fact
there is no sci e nt if i c evide nce that will support that
contention .''

This ob j ect i on ca nnot be sidestepped by

employing my sugge s t e d c onceptualization of psychology as
science with a difference .

I f psychologists cannot

accurately post - diet men tal states, particularly to a
singula r moment in ti me, they simply should not offer such
testimony .
Sadly , a no t her branch of expert testimony has shown
psycholog · s ts more th an wil ling to offer testimony clearly
bey o nd t he i r com pete nc e.

The matter of predictions of

da ng erousness, more often applicable to civil cases but
re l evant to criminal proceedings as well, has been
exhaustively researched, and the evidence is clear:
Psycholog i sts cannot accurately predict dangerousness (Lane
& Kling,

1978; Morse, 1978; Shah, 1977; White, 1982).

Despite the evidence, courts continue to ask psychologists
to make such predictions, and many continue to oblige them.
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Overextending the limits of their expertise is one
problem; departing completly from their area of expertise is
far more serious, yet this is ultimately the result of much
expert psychological testimony.

Recall the discussion of

the legal and social nature of insanity tests.

When

psychologists offer testimony directly on the tests
employed, they not only subvert the proper role of the jury,
but they are clearly out of their element.

For one thing,

the language of insanity tests is decidedly nonpsychological.
nomenclature:

Haward (1979) suggests a problem with
''Psychologists are forced to compress their

cientific concepts into purely legal notions like 'disease
of the mind' which are meaningless to a scientist'' (p. 52).
Th

problem with language, however, is secondary to the fact

that psychologists have no expertise to offer the court
regarding issues of law and morality.

Juries certainly have

a right to any information psychologists may offer regarding
a defendant claiming insanity.

They also have the right to

accept or reject such testimony as they see fit.

But when

psychologists comment directly on the ultimate issue of a
defendant's sanity, they assume the roles of expert jurors,
roles they have no qualifications for, roles they should not
be invited to fill, roles which really do not even exist.
Newman and Rogers (1983) elaborate:

"Unfortunately, the way

the law is presently structured, in things like the insanity
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defense, the psychiatrist is required to make a conceptual
leap.

He must go from his diagnosis of schizophrenia, or

his finding that this person had a serious distortion in the
understanding of reality, to what is in essence a
non-psychiatric conclu sion, a legal conclusion, namely that
this person was not able to tell right from wrong; and this
is the kind of thing that a psychiatrist is not
scientifically or professionally equipped to do because they
are really moral decisions."
There are clearly many problems with expert psycholo ical testimony.

Not the least of which is psychology's

apparent unwillingness to adapt to the conceptualizations
and practices attendant to the legal arena, which are quite
different from those it is familiar and comfortable with.
On the other hand, the criminal justice system, for reasons
of its own, has largely accommodated, and even encouraged
psychology's awkward sojourns through the courts.

There are

significant social and historical forces at work here,
forces which help to explicate both the excesses of expert
psychological testimony as well as the courts' acceptance of
such.

Before examining these forces, Fingarette and Hasse

(1979) offer a useful summary of the problems expert
testimony engenders:

"As things stand now, expert testimony

reflects either of two unhelpful tendencies:

either it

moves into depths and nuances of diagnosis and of technical
terminology that easily leaves a jury stranded; or it
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achieves pseudo-clarity by allowing expert witnesses to
offer a sequence of medical sounding cliches that conform
verbally to legal formulas but provide no factual insight to
the jury" (p. 11).
D spite the often-heard complaint by psychologists that
they are forced to compress their psychological testimony to
accommodate legal standards, clearly no psychologists have
been coerced or compelled to provide such testimony.

Simply

by v·rtue of its willing participation in the process must
psychology bear at least part of the responsibility for the
excesses of expert testimony.

Not withstanding the

remunerative as ects of such testimony, psychologists
generally offer expert testimony with the conviction that
they play an important and necessary part in the process,
and at least indir ctly are furthering the cause of justice.
To t e extent tl at this is true, it is not surprising to
f i d psychology anxious to increase its standing and

influence within the criminal justice system.

The

implementation of the Durham rule is the best example of
psychology's efforts at adapting the system to its own
standards and procedures.

Even though Durham has long since

been superseded, psychology's efforts to expand and solidify
its influence have continued, to the point where many of its
questionable activities go unchallenged.

To attorney

Dershowitz (1968), "it is a discouraging history of
usurpation and abdication; of an expert being summoned for a
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limited purpose, assuming his own indispensability, and then
persuading the law to ask the critical questions in terms
which make him more comfortable and his testimony more
relevant to the questions posed, but to make the questions
less relevant to the purposes of the law'' (p. 30).
Although the end result Dershowitz refers to is perhaps
less common today than it used to be, the process he
describes may help us to understand the increasingly secure
place of psychology within the criminal justice system.
That psychology has expanded its influence is not open to
question.
whe

A serious question does remain, however, as to

er psy hology's influence has exceeded that which its

ex ert status rightfully affords.

This must be answered in

the affirmative, and not just because psychology is
answerin

questions it should not be asked.

Of greater

concern is the message which the social sciences have subtly
but consistently tried to convey to the courts as well as
the general public, namely that there exist two distinct
classes of people processed by the courts:
the mentally disturbed.

criminals and

Psychology has put itself forward

as being able to distinguish between these two groups.

By

virtue of this assertion, in conjunction with its
unwillingness to both appreciate and accept the legal nature
of legal standards of insanity, psychology has exceeded the
limits of its expertise.

In so doing, the nature of
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criminal justice as it relates to insanity has been
significantly altered.

Torrey (1974) has suggested that:

by lobbying for the nonresponsibility for a class
of individuals called the mentally ill, psychiatry
has contributed large amounts of mud to the clear
stream of reason. Psychiatrists have been allowed
to gradually assume increasing responsibility for
deciding who can stand trial, and, once on trial,
who is guilty. The decision-making process has
become increasingly me~ical and decreasingly
judicial. (p. 184)
The medicalization of justice is a matter of grave concern,
havi g the potential of undermining the entire system.

Due

to the confusion arising from differing uses of the term
mental illness, as well as to the unwillingness of
psychology to face up to the fact that legal standards and
psychological ones are fundamentally different, this
medicalization has proceeded slowly and subtly, but
steadily.

In fact, the changes have gone largely unnoticed,

and their implications unconsidered.

And to the extent that

this medicalization of criminal proceedings has distorted
the normal process of trial by jury, as it clearly has, then
the implications for social policy are certainly serious and
profound.

Fortunately, the trends just discussed are not

proceeding inexorably, and some indications of reversal and
remedy will be discussed shortly.
It would be both wrong and unfair to place the entire
burden of responsibility for the excesses of expert
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testimony completely upon the psychological practitioners
who offer such testimony, simply because such testimony has
largely been welcomed by the courts.

Quite simply, such

testimony allows the court to deal with certain individuals
more easily and comfortably than if such testimony were not
forthcoming.

The extent to which the process is medicalized

is the extent to which it has yielded decision-making
authority, and therefore responsibility, for certain
individuals, namely those persons pleading insanity.

Such

persons raise vexing problems for criminal justice, and
deference to experts can provide an easy way out (Torrey,
1974).
The e problems are again related to the problem of
different conceptions of mental illness, the ambiguity of
insanity tests and the confusion regarding legal and
psychological standards.

Clearly, the legal community must

come to grips with the same issues as the psychological
community.

Equally clearly, and again perhaps with the best

of intentions, the criminal justice system has often seen
fit to allow the excesses of expert testimony.

Whatever the

motivation, however, one cannot ignore the fact that the use
of experts continually serves to take pressure off the
courts to deal directly with certain contentious
individuals.

Leifer (1964), who focuses on the semantic

aspects of these problems, suggests that "the use of a
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' scientific exper t' to aid in the determination of responsibility e a ses the burden o f t he court by giving the
impression that t he de t er mina t ion rests on a scientifically
determined fact rath er t han on an ambiguous matter of
semantics" (p . 827) .
Szasz (1979), whose vi ews on what he considers the
mythical status of ment a l il lness are by now well-known,
logica ly applies his views t o th e med i ca l arena through the
concept of psychiatric div e r s i on , which he defines as "any
psychiatric intervention in connectio n with individuals who
are charged with or c onvict ed o f a crime, as well as with
individuals whose 'misbehavi or ' mi ght but need not be
construed as constituting l awbr eak i ng" (p. 135).

Needless

to say, Szasz strongly disappr o ves o f an y ex pert testimony,
which represents one of the clearest expressions of
psych · atric diversion .

By vi r t ue of the controversial

nature of Szasz' ba s ic views, concepts that arise from them
will be no less contentiou s.

However, the process Szasz

describes, regardle s s o f ho w it o r iginates, does help to
shed some light on t he reason for the courts' allowance of
expe r t testimony wh ic h may be excessive.

Szasz is expanding

on t he util it a r i an aspec t s of such testimony, from the
courts ' po i nt of view, when he says that psychiatric
d i ve rsion "provides a mechanism that simultaneously allays
the citizens' guilt for punishing certain acts and actors,
and satisfies their need for security by depriving certain
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a c ts of their legitimacy and certain actors of their
lib e r t y" (p. 139).

Unfortunately for Szasz, in arguing

a g ainst expert testimony he strongly, if paradoxically and
unwil lin gl y, supports the concept of an insanity defense.
The s i mil a ri tie s between the above and the discussed
traditional under stand i ng of mental illness are undeniable.
The idea that cert a in people who commit crimes should not be
held r esponsible , by vi r t ue of craziness, irrationality,
et . , has a long and l egit i mate tradition and is, after all,
precisel y what ins a ni ty tests attempt to convey.

The fact

that some juro r s migh t feel guilty about disposing of some
cases without t he opt ion o f a n insanity verdict if anything
argues for the l e git im acy o f such an option.

Nonetheless,

Szasz mi ht be more f av o ra bl y d i sposed towards the process
were it not fo r the inordinate influence that psychiatry and
psychology have at t ained.

It is precisely the extent of

this i nflu e nce th at the concept of psychiatric diversion is
most t e lli ng l y addre s se d t o.

Sza sz a l so draws attention to

the iss ue o f t he morality of punishment, an is sue most
wr ite r s in th i s area pay scant attention to.

In sum, and

a g ain regardless of the origins of the concept, psychiatric
d i version provides a reasonable conceptualization for
understanding a process which c l early facilitates excessive
expert testimony.

So long as excessive testimony is

accepted, Szasz' critique will have serious merit, "partly
because psychiatric diversion subverts the rule of law, and
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partly because the rhetoric of diagnosis and therapy diverts
attention from the fact of wrong doing and the moral
legitimacy of punishment" (Szasz, 1979, p. 235).
There are, of course, other ways of viewing the problem
of excessive testimony.

Slovenko (1982) apparently views

them as of little consequence, preferring instead to
concentrate on what he views as the ultimately beneficial
results that accrue to the system as a result of expert
testimony of any ilk.

His conclusion is worth repeating:

Psychiatric testimony, whether or not acceptable,
opens options to judge and jury. It brings
flexibility and an element of humanity into the
law. What is accepted as an excuse, or as proof,
depends on whether one is sympathetic to it. The
tendency is to find a causal nexus between one
horrible condition or incident and another,
although they may have little or nothing to do
with each other. Whether a judge or jury accepts
or declines excusing testimony is for them to
decide - but without some testimony they may not
be able to rationalize a decision they would like
to return. The scale is the symbol of justice,
but the court does not want measurement or
empirical evidence. Empirical evidence is too
boring, too dehumanizing, and would not fulfill
the function of the trial as a morality play.
(p.

119)

It is interesting that an analysis which clearly contains
elements of psychiatric diversion is so favorable to the
enterprise.

More to the point, the acceptability of

psychiatric testimony is too important a question to be
glossed over.

However, the question of acceptability may be

answered by considering the confusion the · passage shows
between what constitutes evidence and what constitutes
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de c is i ons.

Experts are intended to provide evidence to help

j ur ie s r e ac h dec isions.

Whe n "excusing testimony" is

offered, this is no longer evidence, but a conclusion, a
d eci s i o n which is meant to be decided by a jury.

Excusing

testimony is the r e by unacceptable, as it clearly exceeds the
com etence of any expert, and i mproperly impedes the jury in
its pursuit of justice, via an impartial weighing of the
evidence given in te s timony .
After examining the confusio n that dominates this
intersection of law an d psyc holog y, it would be surprising
indeed if such confu s ion had not permeated the most critical
link in the process , nam e ly t he jury

it~elf.

If laywers and

psychologists approach t he i nte r f a c e without a firm grasp,
or at least concern wi t h the esse n tial issues, then juries
will quite nat ur a l ly react to this confusion in their
deliberations .

Simon ( 1980), reporting on some of her

extensive work with experimental jury situations, states:
Durin g t he trial, in cross examination both
d ef en se ps ychi atrists had insisted that insanity
was a judi c ial term and involved a determination
wh i ch they di d not feel qualified to make. This
statement was a source of considerable puzzlement
i n practically every deliberation. One juror
expressed it this way:
'What I don't clearly
understand i s are we talking in terms of legal
insan i ty; or technical insanity; or medical
i nsan i ty, the jargon of the psychiatrists?'
( p. 59)
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It is insufficient to simply say that jury confusion is but
a reflection of the confusion of the professionals involved.
Rather, and as the above quote merely hints, jury confusion
is directly related to excessive expert testimony.

Simon

refers to an often-heard disclaimer that many experts make,
w erein they rightfully express their limitations in
answering legal questions.

Unfortunately, this disclaimer

is then, as often as not, cavalierly cast aside, and the
legal questions are answered anyway.
juries get confused.

It is no wonder that

First they hear the experts provide

information which may help them arrive at a verdict, then
they hear a verdict suggested to them.

The difference

between a jury arriving at a verdict, using data provided by
experts in the process, and a jury simply deciding to agree
or disagree with one or more experts, is no less than the
di ference between trial by jury, a hallmark of democratic
l"fe, and trial by experts, a concept without legal status
and decidedly undemocratic in its implications.

This is the

subversion of the jury's role to which I have referred
throughout this paper.

Juries find themselves trying to

resolve issues which should not even be issues.

"The jury

worked hard at resolving to their own satisfaction the
problem of who should have final say about what happens to
the defendant - a jury of laymen or a group of medical
experts" (Simon, 1980, p. 58).

The answer to this question
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is so o bv i ous that it shou l d not even be asked.

That it is

as k e d is sim pl y ref l ective of psychology's unwillingness to
hee d its own d i sc l aimers.

If psychologists ceased answering

questions inap pr o pr i ate to them, juries would be much more
able to fill , and mo re sure of, their roles and
responsibilities .
On the other ha nd , there are ways for psychological
experts to help .

They s hou l d provide information about

defendants that judge a nd j ury mi gh t otherwise not hear.
Testimony should avoid any professional jargon which could
confuse a jury .

Retrospecti ve probab i lity data and clinical

impressions ma y be provi de d (Mo rse, 1978), and the witness
should be sure to convey the nat ure of su c h evidence.

As

discussed, psychology is a sc i ence rat her unique unto
itself, and this spec ial nature needs to be communicated to
the jury, not hidden from it behind medical sounding cliches
and te r minology.

Parti cu l ar care should be used in offering

testimony about an i nd i vi dual's conduct or thought that
occu rr ed well befo re an y court-related psychiatric
eval uation.

Informed opinion is welcome, but again only so

l on g as it i s presented as such.
Ideally, test i mony directly on matters of mental
il l ness or psych i atric diagnosis should present no problem,
for jurors would be clear on the important distinctions
between legal and psychiatric standards, and understanding
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of the fact that the two bear no necessary relationship to
each other.

However, the criminal justice system is far

from an ideal system, and the inclusion of such testimony
only serves to cloud the issues to be decided.

Besides, it

is specific information the jury needs, not the labels the
professionals use to organize the information.

Under

current circumstances, labels may impede rather than help
the jury.

Accordingly, Morse's (1978) prescription for

proper expert testimony seems well within reason:
In sum, in my opinion mental health professionals
should not testify about diagnoses or report
conclusion about mental illness or even
abnormality. They should simply tell the court
about the allegedly disturbed person's thoughts,
feelings and actions that the court is not likely
to hear from family, friends, neighbors or other
lay observers. Then the judge or jury can decide
the legal issue of normality presented by the
behavior of the disturbed person. (p. 396)
The recent and locally celebrated insanity defense
trial of Thomas Provenzano provides bountiful evidence for
the types of testimonial excess I have been addressing.

The

trial itself was fairly typical, dominated as it was by the
now familiar battle of the experts.

Also as is typical,

most witnesses were not at all reticent about addressing the
issue of the defendant's sanity directly.

But perhaps of

even greater concern is the expert testimony offered before
the trial began.

As is customary in cases such as this,

three psychiatrists were appointed to examine Provenzano to
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determine competency to stand trial.

This really means

no t h i ng more than that the defendant can understand the
ch ar ges a gainst him/her, and can cooperate with his or her
attorney in p reparin g a defense.

However, two of the

psychiatris ts in this c ase offered far more than an
evaluation of compete ncy to stan d trial.

As reported in the

Orlando Sentinel o f Feb r uary 25, 1984 (Trager, 1984a),
''(P ychiatr ' st A), th ou gh ack nowledging that Provenzano had
suffered from ps ychological problems, concluded that he was
sane at the time of the s hooting and is competent to stand
trial'' (p. BS) .
appraisal .

wit

A se c o nd expert offered a similar

Though I hav e s poke n earlier of the problems

expe r ts answe r ing qu e stions they should not be asked,

here we have expert s a nswer i ng questions they were not asked
at all .

As di s t urbing as suc h pronouncements are, more so

is the fact th a t no ob j e c tion was made, in any public
quarter , to the experts offering them.

Other experts

d i s agr e ed , of course, but no one disputed the propriety of
maki ng and a i ring such judgments.

Such a situation offers

c ompellin g evidence for the increased medicalization of the
legal process, at least insofar as insanity is concerned, as
well as for the institutionalization, and thereby implied
legitimacy, of such medicalization.

The tragedy is that

this process has occurred slowly and subtly, so that few are
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even aware of how the nature of the legal process has been
altered.
The trial itself, not surprisingly, contained the same
excesses.

On June 19, 1984 (Trager, 1984b), the Sentinel

featured a front page story headed "Doctors say Provenzano
was sane", and the lead paragraph reads:

"Three court-

appointed psychiatrists testified for the prosecution Monday
that Thomas Provenzano was legally sane at the time of the
shootout" (p. A1).

Again we clearly see the technical

problems associated with post-dieting a state of mind
existent well before the psychiatric interview.

More

importantly, we see a subversion of the jury's purpose;
experts mak · ng judgments only a jury should make, juries
getti g confused, and justice suffering.
By now it is clear that the problems of excessive
expert testimony cannot be separated from the problems with
currently used insanity tests.

These two areas are

connected in myriad, subtle, but always symbiotic ways.
Accordingly, no amount of reducing excessive psychological
testimony will be sufficient to clear up the confusion and
injustice at the interface without a concomitant effort to
improve insanity statutes, which both support and allow for
such testimony.

Along these lines, the "Disability of Mind"

doctrine (DOM) of Fingarette and Hasse (1979) merits strong
consideration.

It states:
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If a person's mental powers are impaired in such a
way as to disable him at least to some material
extent fro m rational control of his conduct in
respect to t he requirements of the criminal law,
the person in that respect acts with materially
l essened criminal responsibility. If the
impa i rment is of such magnitude that he is in
ch i ef part disabled, he acts in that respect
witho ut c r i minal responsibility.
(p. 200)
T is doct r in e is valuable for a number of readily apparent
reasons.

Mo s t bas i cally, it captures better than any other

s andard the hi st o r i cal and popular understanding of what it
means to be ment a l ly ill.

It makes no reference to disease

or mental de fe c t, a nd in fact would de-medicalize the
insanity de fen se.

Expert ps ychological testimony would then

become an optiona l part of the process, not an inherent
aspect .
les

In short, t he su gg estion that psychologists offer

n thei r te st imony, particularly as regards conclusion

d ra win , is lik ely to a c h i eve real meaning only in the
context of a l egal standard such as DOM.

By placing

d eci si o n-making power firmly in the hands of the jury, where
i t r igh tl y be l on gs, DOM could go a long way towards
res t oring expert testimony to its rightful purpose of simply
a i d i ng the jury in its task.
While DOM has much to recommend it, it is not perfect.
Though it would set a legal standard, the central concept of
rationality goes largely undefined, and as such is open to
varying interpretation.

But perhaps it cannot be otherwise,

for as a social concept rationality may require a degree of
flexibility and adaptability to accommodate the infinitely
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wi de variet y of situations where it is an issue. Fingarette
an d Ha s se ( 19 79 ) po i nt out that "the discrepancy between a
defend an t's actual capacities and those normally presumed
must be a ss e ss e d i n l ight of the specific circumstances of
the particu la r a c t.

The j ury must decide whether the

discrepancy is enough , and ?f suitable kind, to ascribe
non - responsibility '' ( p. 23 3 ).
DOM is unique in oth er respe c ts.

No t only does it

allow for findings of compl e t e o r partial disability, but
the jury would also det er mi ne whet her the defendant had any
culpability in his or her d i sa bil i ty.
· s absen

Such a determination

in other in sa nity tes t s, and its inclusion gives

jurors needed flexibi lity i n assessing responsibility.
criminal justice sy s tem would do well to look closely at
DOM.

The

CHAPTER IV
Looking Ahead
The p ' ctu r e I ha ve draw n of the interface of criminal
justice and ps ych olog y is admittedly less than flattering.
Some mig t vie w my c onc erns about the dangers of excessive
xper
true

test·mony t o the e ntire system as alarmist.

hat the issues I have discussed have been considered

by relat'vely few un til fair l y recently.
trie

It is

However, I have

to show that these issues have actually been with us

for many hundreds of yea r s.

I t is only the fact of the

cur · ous evo ution of t he law / psy ch ology interface that has
served to dimin is h both public and professional awareness of
th

basic issues , i ss ues concerning rights and responsi-

bilities .

In s hort , the concerns I voice are not new or

origi nal; it i s, ho wever, extremely difficult for them to
find wide exp r ess i on within the current legal-psychological
climate .
The re have been some encouraging developments.

In

198 2 , the California Penal Code (1982) was changed to

proh i bit expert psychological witnesses from offering
conclusions on the matter of sanity, thereby restoring
ultimate decision-making power to the jury, where it
properly belongs.
first step.

This is an important step, but only a

The code still allows the court to accept
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expert testimony about a defendant's state of mind at the
t i me of a n a l le ged offense.

The line between legal and

psychologic al standards will almost certainly remain blurry,
a nd

urors wi l l co nt inue to be confused.

Still, California

juries may now ha ve a be tter sense of their own
responsibi ities .
A s · ro · lar change we nt int o effect in the federal courts
in late 1984 .

According t o the A.P.A. Mon i tor, "the

men al health expe r t wil l be restricted in court to
explaining the nat ure o f the defendant's mental disease or
defect .

The witne s s will be prohibited from commenting on

wheth r that condition cont ributed to the commission of the
crime, that is , if it pr e ve nted the defendant from understanding that he was committin g a wrongful act'' (Cunningham,
1984, p. 25) .

Onc e a gai n a very positive step, yet still

the medical mod e l remai ns quite intact, and only time will
tell if thi s one c ha ng e, important as it is, will translate
into mo r e ge nui ne dec i sion-making power being returned to
ur i e s .
To r ecap itu l a t e this thesis:

The insanity defense, a

l e gal and social instrument, has attended virtually all
human l egal systems.

It is basically a manifestation of a

deeply felt and historically held concept wherein a lack of
rationality implies at least a diminution of ascribed
responsibility.

Problems surfaced with the development of

the social sciences, most particularly psychology and
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ps yc hiatry.

Through a process both complex and convoluted,

le g al standards and psychological practice became not just
intertwined, but confused.

As insanity statutes became more

scien tif i c sounding, and as social scientists strove to
become , or at l east appear, more scientific, the judicial
process becam e l ess j ust, in the sense that ''trial by one's
peers," a tim e-h on ored, democratic ideal, appears to have
been significantly co mp rom i sed.

The evolution of insanity

tests and the r i se i n t he influence of expert psychological
witnesses follow pa r a lle l paths, and are in fact mutually
sustainin
how we

proc es ses .

I t is impossible to specify clearly

ot from th e re , whe n justice was administered without

any experts at all , t o here, where expert testimony is often
excessiv , and where con c lus i o ns that are uncalled for, even
unasked, are rou t in ely answered.
There is c er t ainly need for further research.

We need

to underst a nd mo r e about how juries operate, about the
d i fferenti a l effects of various insanity tests.

We need to

e xa mi ne clos el y such alternative ideas as DOM to see how
t he y ma y hel p improve the system.

We need to know more

about such admittedly amorphous but important concepts as
responsibility; how it develops, how it changes, how people
apply it to themselves and others.
need to know.

Yes, there is a lot we

But far more urgent is the need for others to

know that which is already available.

In researching this

paper I have become convinced that everyone needs to know
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more about the workings of the law.

Lawyers and judges need

to know much more about psychology - its basic concepts, its
practices, and equally important its limitations and
shortcomings.

Psychologists working in this area need far

greater understanding of not only contemporary legal
practice, but its underlying philosophy as well.

In short,

there is a far more pressing need for education than
research.

Of course, in this regard, research into means of

accomplishing the varied types of education needed is both
urgent and necessary.
Speaking for psychology, there is much we can do.

We

can stop answering questions beyond our competence, which
i nc ludes making conclusions on strictly legal matters.

We

should remind ourselves, and help others to become aware of
the fact that insanity is not a psychological concept, and
that we really have nothing to say about it directly.

Above

all, and inherent in all my comments, is the need for
greater honesty, first with ourselves, and then with others.
The medical model opened up many doors for psychology, but
may now impede its progress in the legal arena.

By

detaching ourselves from this model even a little bit, we
may find more avenues to understanding open to us.

Psycho-

logy will be enhanced, not diminished, by its owning up to
its limitations; it would only open up more possibilities,
and offer some hope of furthering the cause of justice.
Robinson (1973) warns, "The greatest danger is that the

As
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public will think we know what we are doing instead of
appreciating the experimental nature of our enterprise.
Recognizing that it is experimental, society will be able to
determine the extent to which it wishes to participate" (p.
1 33)

.

Throughout this paper I have used the term excessive to
describe expert testimony which is inappropriate and
un · ust . fied.

The word is useful in that it clearly

specifies a simple and straightforward remedy, for this is
surely a case where less is better.

In order to insure that

juries continue to make needed judgments, in an atmosphere
ot d mina ed by expert pronouncement, it is necessary only
that the experts refrain, or be restrained, from promoting
the ' r own conclusions, conclusions only juries should make.
We need

onstantly to remind ourselves of the disclaimer the

experts often make but then forget.

The ultimate finding to

be arrived at is a social judgment, and psychology has no
expertise to offer in making such judgments (Gass, 1981).
In short, a psychologist should never offer an opinion
as to a defendant's sanity.

There can be little doubt that

if this serious testimonial excess were eliminated, much of
the criticism leveled against expert testimony would
evaporate.

For example, Robinson's (1980) contention that

"the inclusion of such 'experts' places jurors in the
position of diagnosticians once they accept the testimony of
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'experts' as evidence'' (p. 63) would lose most of its
relevance and impact in the absence of conclusion drawing by
the experts.

There should be no serious objection to

experts helping in the decision-making process, so long as
they just help and do not themselves decide.

AUTHOR NOTES
1For purposes of this paper, and despite their many
real world differences, the terms psychology and psychiatry,
psychologist and psychiatrists, etc., will be used
interchangeably.
2 rn a closely related area, White (1982) reports the
results of a survey of Ohio psychologists, of whom 72%
thought psychologists should be involved in dealth penalty
proceedings, while only 18% thought they should not be
involvea at all.
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